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I. BUILDING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Efforts to foster ethics in government1 should begin at the local,2 
rather than the state or national,3 level.  City officials and employees 
 
 1 Ethics are “‘the rules that translate characteristic ideals or ethos into everyday 
practice.’”  Susan Corby, The Ethics of Equal Opportunities, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 35, 36 (Richard A. Chapman ed., 2000) (quoting the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development after it looked at public ser-
vice cross-nationally).  “Ethics in public service is about the practical application of 
moral standards in government.”  Robert A. Chapman, Ethics in Public Service for the 
New Millennium, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra, at 217, 
218.  “[I]n the public sector, ethics embraces the values that public officers bring to 
the exercise of power and responsibility.”  Harry W. Reynolds, Jr., Preface, 537 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 9, 9 (1995). 
 2 This Article focuses on cities as the basic unit of local government.  However, 
in many respects, the same principles for good government would apply to other lo-
cal government units, such as counties, townships, and villages.  But see Helen W. 
Gunnarsson, Ethics Overkill?, 92 ILL. B.J. 288, 288 (2004) (discussing problems with 
imposing stringent ethics regulations on small governmental entities and quoting a 
source as stating that “many units of local government, such as mosquito abatement 
districts and library boards, are very small” and “‘there’s just no reasonable basis for a 
three-member body’s creation of an ethics commission or appointment of an ethics 
officer’”). 
 3 Many ethics laws have been enacted at the federal and state levels.  See THE 
BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, THE BGA INTEGRITY INDEX 1–2 (2002), 
http://www.bettergov.org/pdfs/IntegrityIndex_10.22.02.pdf (ranking state laws 
dealing with conflicts of interest, gifts, and other ethics issues); UNITED STATES OFFICE 
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make a broad range of decisions that affect the welfare of citizens in 
many ways.  Those actions—relating, for example, to licensing, zon-
ing, contracting, hiring, and basic municipal services4—determine to 
a large extent whether, on an everyday basis, people have equal ac-
cess to the benefits and opportunities that government provides. 
Officials who begin their careers in local government often pro-
gress to other positions in state or national settings.5  If proper values6 
and ethical practices have been ingrained in those officials when they 
first serve in local government, there is reason to hope that the same 
high standards and practices may follow them when their careers 
move to a broader stage.7  However, if officials start their careers un-
 
OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS, COMPILATION OF FEDERAL ETHICS LAWS (2004), http://www. 
usoge.gov/pages/laws_regs_fedreg_stats/comp_fed_ethics_laws.pdf (reproducing 
texts).  Some ethics laws are so complex as to be virtually unreadable.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 208 (2000) (imposing restrictions on participation in matters involving a po-
tential employer).  However, one occasionally finds a clear statement of ethics prin-
ciples.  See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b) (2005) (articulating general principles applicable 
to federal executive branch employees). 
 4 For example, the City of San Antonio’s website lists more than one hundred 
categories of services that the city provides to residents, ranging from adult basic 
education, alarm permits, and arson investigation to waste collection, youth recrea-
tion, and zoning.  Services on the San Antonio Community Portal, http://www. 
sanantonio.gov/services.asp?res=1024&ver=true (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). 
 5 See, e.g., Erin P. Billings, Hill Mourns Matsui’s Passing, ROLL CALL, Jan. 4, 2005, 
available at 2005 WLNR 89937 (discussing a Congressman who had previously served 
on the Sacramento City Council); Ellen Gedalius, Commissioners Cast Eyes Toward 
2006: 5 Could Run for Office, Undoing Board Harmony, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 21, 2005, at 1, 
available at 2005 WLNR 13850599 (discussing speculation that two county commis-
sioners would run for seats in Congress); Mark Simon, Senate and Assembly Primaries: 
Democrats Duel in March to Control November, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 29, 2004, at D3, 
available at 2004 WLNR 7626261 (discussing several candidates for the legislature 
who had served in local government as supervisors or members of city councils or 
school boards); Dennis J. Willard, Ohio House Election is Battle: Slaby-Williams Clash in 
Summit is Rare.  Area Races Incumbent-Heavy, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 17, 2004, at B1, 
available at 2004 WLNR 18788911 (discussing state re-election bids involving three 
legislators who had previously served in city government, one on the Cuyahoga Falls 
City Council, another on the Akron City Council, and a third on the Kent City Coun-
cil). 
 6 In contrast to the nonpublic arena, “[p]ublic sector values emphasize . . . 
avoiding conflict of interest, discharging one’s responsibilities fairly and impartially, 
shunning private gain in the course of discharging public tasks, and promoting the 
public interest.”  Reynolds, supra note 1, at 9. 
 7 See Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Law-
yer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 397 (1990–91) (discuss-
ing formation of moral habits and arguing that virtues “are something you learn and 
perfect as you grow, more than they are something you choose”).  Cf. Colin Camp-
bell, Democratic Accountability and Models of Governance: Purchaser/Provider, 
Owner/Trustee, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 
141, 141 (“A culture which does not bring officials along gradually in the exercise of 
discretion can expect a high incidence of opportunistic entrepreneurship from pub-
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der circumstances which tolerate unethical conduct, it will be difficult 
or impossible to change bad practices when those persons move to 
less immediate settings for public service.8 
Focusing on city government ethics may also be the best way to 
build public support for high standards of conduct at all levels of 
government.9  If the public comes to expect (and demand) fair 
treatment and ethical conduct from city officials and employees—the 
governmental actors who affect their lives most frequently and di-
rectly—they are more likely to have high expectations (and de-
mands) for those who hold the reins of power in state and national 
arenas.10 
This Article offers a distinctly American perspective11 on legal 
regulation of ethics in government at the local level.12  The Article re-
flects a number of important assumptions that are widely embraced 
today13 in the United States, but sometimes not broadly subscribed to 
 
lic servants who encounter greater discretionary power than that for which their 
training prepared them.”); id. at 142 (“Officials who have learned to engage their 
moral agency in ambiguous situations will be more likely to summon the internal 
and institutional resources required for them to behave responsibly when confronted 
with issues of ethical import.”). 
 8 But see Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1751, 1757 (1998) (discussing how, when reason enters moral life, the “rational re-
form of habit follows”). 
 9 This idea is in some respects similar to the “bottom-up” approach of building 
democratic institutions abroad.  See THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY 
ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF ROMANIA 64 (1996) (stating that the “prospects for the in-
ternalization of new norms in a parliament appear to be greater when those norms 
are introduced through the bottom-up approach” of providing assistance to organi-
zations and groups within a country, rather than directly to the foreign parliament 
for training, equipment, etc.). 
 10 Of course, even if public servants take high standards with them from the local 
to state or national level, the public may not hold them in high regard.  “The para-
dox of distance explains that while people trust and even revere those government 
officials who are near at hand, they believe that government officials who are far away 
are lazy, incompetent, and probably dishonest.”  H. George Frederickson & David G. 
Frederickson, Public Perceptions of Ethics in Government, 537 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 163, 167 (1995). 
 11 There are other approaches to ethics in government.  See Mark Davies, Govern-
mental Ethics Laws: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 177, 187 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Davies, Myths] (briefly discussing the “German system of life tenure and high pay 
for government officials in return for stringent ethical standards”). 
 12 This Article assumes that local government is generally distinct from state or 
national government.  That is not always true in other countries.  See CHENGLIN LIU, 
CHINESE LAW ON SARS 45 (2004) (discussing the unitary centralized system in China, 
which emphasizes subordination of the local government to the Central Govern-
ment). 
 13 One author divides the history of ethics in American government into five dis-
tinct phases, described as government by: the righteous (1620–1790); the gentry 
(1790–1828); the humble (1828–64); the meritorious (1865–1945); and the experts 
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in other countries14—which may mean that American ethics standards 
are not readily exportable.15  Two of those assumptions bear noting.  
The first assumption is that all persons—rich and poor, male and fe-
male, majority and minority, young and old, educated and illiterate, 
native and immigrant—should be treated equally by the government, 
and that no person should enjoy an advantage because he or she has 
 
(1945–present).  Hubert G. Locke, Ethics in American Government: A Look Backward, 
537 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 15–21 (1995).  He observes that 
“[p]rinciples held sacred in one period gave rise to excesses that engendered the re-
actions and reforms that ushered in the era that followed.”  Id. at 23. 
 14 See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 720–21 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, America’s Preoccupation] (dis-
cussing the Chinese concept of “guanxi,” “the use of special connections and privi-
leged relationships for the purpose of gaining an advantage or accomplishing re-
sults,” which has been said to “pervade every aspect of Chinese culture”). 
 15 Romania, a country with one of the worst public corruption problems in 
Europe, is a case in point.  The Constitution of Romania broadly endorses principles 
of equality.  Article 4 states that “Romania is the common and indivisible homeland 
of all of its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic 
origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social ori-
gin.”  CONSTITUTIA ROMÂNIEI art. 4(2).  Article 16 proclaims that “Citizens are equal 
before the law and public authorities, without any privilege or discrimination.”  Id. 
art. 16(1).  These provisions can be read as committing Romania to the same ideals 
of equal treatment that animate American concerns about ethics in government.  
However, the United States is a country with a history and traditions very different 
from Romania.  In particular, American society has long been individualistic, afflu-
ent, and highly mobile, and it now enjoys the benefit of mature, well-established gov-
ernmental and professional institutions.  Romania has only recently emerged from 
the yoke of communism, prosperity is yet to be fully achieved, and mobility (both 
geographic and social) is less pervasive in Romania than in the United States.  More-
over, Romanian governmental and professional institutions are still young and de-
veloping.  There is reason to question whether the type of government ethics regula-
tions that are appropriate today in the United States could also work in Romania at 
this point in Romanian history.  Furthermore, codified rules can play only a limited 
role in assuring high ethical standards; beyond that, much depends upon the charac-
ter and integrity of the persons who hold government positions.  Yet, when the 
European Union, international organizations, and foreign businesses urge Romania 
to improve accountability and transparency in government, they may be thinking of 
the type of legal regulations that are now found in the United States and other de-
veloped countries.  See generally TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2005, (2005) http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr 
/download_gcr_2005.  The Transparency International Country Report for Romania 
indicates that Romania ranks 87 out of 146 countries in the Corruption Perceptions 
Index.  Id. at 196.  That is the lowest ranking in Europe, except for Albania and Ser-
bia & Montenegro.  Id. at 235.  The report states that there are “gaping legal and 
administrative flaws in the Romanian public integrity system.”  Id. at 198.  The 
United States, tied with Belgium and Ireland, ranked 17th on the Corruption Per-
ceptions index.  Id. at 235. 
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a special relationship to those who exercise governmental power.16  In 
colloquial terms, Americans believe that everyone should stand be-
fore the government on “equal footing.”17  This expectation is now 
deeply held by Americans, but the view was probably not so common 
in earlier times.18 
At the time of the American revolution, “bribery, favoritism, and 
corruption in a great variety of forms were rampant not only in [Brit-
ish] politics, but at all levels of society.”19  At least some of those per-
nicious practices were alive in the colonies in North America as well.  
George Washington, long universally revered for his high standards 
of conduct, is said to have “joined a group of ten investors, most 
members of the Virginia Council or House of Burgesses, who used 
their influence as insiders to purchase forty thousand acres of swamp-
land that they proposed to drain and develop.”20  Nepotism by public 
officials was also once widely practiced.  As historian Stacy Schiff has 
written, “[t]he founding of America was very much a family affair.  
[John] Jay’s private secretary in Spain was his . . . brother-in-law; Jef-
ferson invited a distant relative as his clerk when he sailed to Paris in 
1784.”21  Washington urged incoming President John Adams to pro-
mote his son, John Quincy, within the diplomatic corps.22  In certain 
 
 16 Cf. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 2-41 (2006) [hereinafter SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE], available at http://www.ci.sat.tx.us/atty/ethics/codetext. 
htm.  Section 2-41 states: 
     It is essential in a democratic system that the public have confidence 
in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of those who act on 
their behalf in government.  Such confidence depends not only on the 
conduct of those who exercise official power, but on the availability of 
aid or redress to all persons on equal terms and on the accessibility and 
dissemination of information relating to the conduct of public affairs. 
Id. 
 17 See generally Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 14, at 725–33 (discuss-
ing ethical rules applicable to lawyers, judges, and public officials which seek to pro-
mote equal treatment of all persons whose interests are affected by the exercise of 
governmental power). 
 18 See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, 
BUSINESS, AND HEALTHCARE 1 (2005) (“Conduct that was widely ignored in previous 
eras (petty graft, nepotism, payola, drunkenness, and physical violence in Congress) 
would be grounds for prosecution today.”). 
 19 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776, at 9 (2005). 
 20 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 54 (2004) (stating that 
the story illustrates Washington’s willingness to “use political connections in Wil-
liamsburg to get what he wanted”). 
 21 STACY SCHIFF, A GREAT IMPROVISATION: FRANKLIN, FRANCE, AND THE BIRTH OF 
AMERICA 342 (2005). 
 22 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 476 (2001) (stating that “before leaving of-
fice [Washington] had written an unsolicited letter expressing the ‘strong hope’ that as 
President, Adams would not withhold ‘merited promotion’ from John Quincy,” 
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cases, favoritism for family members may have promoted the interests 
of good government.  While representing America in France, Benja-
min Franklin made his grandson, William Temple Franklin, his per-
sonal secretary23 and eventually secured for him an official appoint-
ment with the diplomatic mission.24  “Temple’s service solved two of 
Franklin’s most pressing problems.  There was at least one member 
of the Passy household on whose loyalty he could unequivocally rely.  
And the apprenticeship allowed Franklin to streamline his opera-
tion.”25  More recently, one American president concluded that it was 
in the public interest to name his brother as attorney general26 and 
another president appointed his wife to head healthcare reform.27 
Regardless of what the standards for conduct in public life once 
were, they have become ever more demanding.28  Practices that pre-
viously went unnoticed are now subject to objection.  Today, even 
 
whom Washington regarded as “‘the most valuable public character we have 
abroad’”). 
 23 See SCHIFF, supra note 21, at 91–92 (discussing Temple’s service as Franklin’s 
personal secretary). 
 24 See id. at 344 (discussing Temple’s appointment as secretary to the American 
commissioners in Paris—at Franklin’s instigation, with Jay’s consent, and to Adams’ 
disgust). 
 25 Id. at 92. 
 26 See CLARK CLIFFORD & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A 
MEMOIR 335–38 (1991) (discussing President Kennedy’s appointment of his brother, 
Robert Kennedy, to head the Justice Department); Richard P. Wulwick & Frank Mac-
chiarola, Congressional Interference with the President’s Power to Appoint, 24 STETSON L. 
REV. 625, 631 (1995) (stating that “many incorrectly believe that the Federal Anti-
Nepotism statute was enacted in response to” the appointment of Robert Kennedy as 
Attorney General). 
 27 See Carl David Wasserman, Note, Firing the First Lady: The Role and Accountability 
of the Presidential Spouse, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1215, 1219 (1995) (“President Clinton 
quickly appointed his wife to head the President’s Task Force on National Health 
Care Reform . . . , a body formed to prepare health care reform legislation to be 
submitted to Congress within the first 100 days of the Clinton Administration.”).  See 
also Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 916 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (holding that the task force was not required to hold public meetings because 
it was “a committee composed wholly of full-time government officials,” including 
Hillary Clinton). 
 28 See Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust, 94 W. VA. 
L. REV. 281, 281 (1991–92) (“For twenty years or more, extraordinary public atten-
tion has been focused upon the ethics of government officials. . . . [T]he years are 
marked by the promulgation of new and tightened codes often accompanied by new 
machinery for administration and enforcement.”).  But see Adam Cohen, Editorial, 
‘The Shame’ That Lincoln Steffens Found Has Not Left Our Country, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2004, § 4, at 10, available at 2004 WLNR 5501526 (discussing the one hundredth an-
niversary of the muckraking book, The Shame of Cities, which condemned public cor-
ruption and still sounds a “rallying cry that resonates today”). 
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those in high government positions are commonly called to account 
for allegedly unethical conduct.29 
The current prevailing view that no one should enjoy an advan-
tage based on special connections to those in office is a result of pow-
erful streams of social development.30  First, the twentieth century in 
America was in large measure a search for equal opportunity.31  Over 
the course of that century, there were great efforts in the United 
States to reduce the barriers to opportunity caused by poverty, to im-
prove the status and treatment of minorities and women, to protect 
consumers from abusive business practices, and to welcome immi-
grants to the mainstream of American prosperity.32  It would be sur-
prising if a country so dedicated to civil rights and social fairness were 
not also committed to ethical principles that attempt to ensure that 
all persons have a fair chance to benefit from the services and oppor-
tunities that government offers.  If Americans fall short in their quests 
for social equality or for ethics in government, it is not because the 
primacy of those ideals is doubted. 
The second key assumption animating American debates about 
ethics in government is that law is a proper tool for ensuring good 
 
 29 The most egregious cases of allegedly unethical conduct often result in crimi-
nal prosecutions.  E.g., John M. Broder, Representative Quits, Pleading Guilty in Graft, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 19186909 (discussing a Cali-
fornia congressman who resigned after taking $2.4 million in bribes “to help friends 
and campaign contributors win military contracts”); Jodi Wilgoren, Trial Shows Ex-
Governor in 2 Lights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A14, available at 2005 WLNR 
15333758 (discussing a prosecution that capped a seven-year investigation that “net-
ted 73 convictions of state officials, political operatives and business leaders”); see also 
Mark Brown, Ryan Seems Cool, Confident as he Gets his Day in Court, CHI. SUN TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 2005, at 2, available at  2005 WLNR 16884965 (stating that in a public cor-
ruption trial the former governor of Illinois was charged with “steering state con-
tracts and leases . . . [to friends] while he and his family members allegedly received 
illegal cash payments, gifts and services in return”). 
 30 See Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 14, at 734–35 ( “[T]he current 
visibility of governmental ethics issues may be an outgrowth of two of the most sig-
nificant developments in American society during the twentieth century—the search 
for social equality . . . and the transformation of professional ethical standards into 
enforceable rules of law . . . .”). 
 31 The search often culminated in the passage of new legislation which amelio-
rated social problems or disparities in wealth or power.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2001h 
(2000)); Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000); 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2000); 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 32 See Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 14, at 735–50 (discussing the 
search for social equality). 
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conduct.33  This is not surprising, for America is a legally oriented cul-
ture that prefers for social problems to be addressed by the adoption 
and enforcement of laws.34  “Many Americans today expect that . . . 
law can, should, and will be used to ensure that a level playing field in 
public life exists by eliminating, insofar as possible, any unfair advan-
tage that might be gained through the use of special connections to 
those who exercise the power of government.”35  Americans in gen-
eral,36 and the American media in particular,37 today38 strongly sup-
port the enactment of ethical standards and the enforcement of 
those norms, not only by special review boards, but also, when neces-
sary, by an independent judiciary.39  American judges themselves are 
 
 33 Cf. Editorial, The Duke Shames the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at A30, 
available at 2005 WLNR 19252273 (calling for Congress to legislate credit controls 
over the dealings between lobbyists and members of Congress and repair “an ethics 
process that now stands as a scandal unto itself”); Vincent R. Johnson, Editorial, Lob-
bying of Officials Undermines Confidence in City Government, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Mar. 5, 1998, at 5B (calling for rules to regulate “big-time” city lobbyists). 
 34 See Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 14, at 752–53 (discussing statu-
tory solutions). 
 35 See id. at 724.  “Governments at both the federal and state levels have re-
sponded to public demands for new rules to limit campaign contributions, require 
disclosure of financial interests, restrict the gifts officials may accept, and regulate 
the types of jobs they may take after they leave office.”  THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 
2. 
 36 Cf. Locke, supra note 13, at 23 (“[I]n the past several decades, a welter of at-
tempts to enact ethical norms into law have been passed by state legislatures and city 
councils . . . .”). 
 37 See THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 2 (stating that in recent years “the media have 
been more aggressive [in covering ethics charges] for good and for ill”); Warren 
Francke, The Evolving Watchdog: The Media’s Role in Government Ethics, 537 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 110 (1995) (“[M]ass media’s influence on the ethics of 
public life is assumed to be significant.”); Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 
14, at 751 (“News reports about the shortcomings of public officials inevitably fuel 
calls for higher ethical standards and stronger enforcement of those norms.”).  See 
also Blake D. Morant, The Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 595, 595–96 (2005) (“Democracy . . . generally con-
notes a governmental structure that is continually monitored by an unabashed media 
industry.”).  Bloggers are also beginning to play a role in prompting calls for ethics in 
government.  See Editorial, New Rules in Yonkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, § 14WC, at 
15, available at 2005 WLNR 16360959 (opining that an “acid-tongued bloggers’ bat-
ting average in exposing hidden outrages” was not particularly high but should not 
be dismissed “out of hand”). 
 38 A half century ago there was less interest in having mandatory ethics rules that 
could be enforced.  See, e.g., Fritz Morstein Marx, Ethics in Local Government, 41 NAT’L 
MUN. REV. 438, 440 (1952) (“[A] ‘code’ of official morality should seek to inform in-
dividual judgment and thus strengthen it, rather than insist on unflinching obedi-
ence to a thousand special rules.”). 
 39 See Patricia E. Salkin, Summary of 2000 Ethics Issues in Land Use, SG021 ALI-ABA 
199, 212 (2001) (“Ethics allegations continue to be made liberally in courts across 
the country.”). 
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heavily regulated by ethical standards that endeavor to ensure that 
special relationships and favoritism play as small a role as possible in 
court decisions.40 
The idea that law should be used to promote ethics in govern-
ment is neither new nor uniquely American.  The centuries-old Con-
stitution of the United States contains provisions addressing conflicts 
of interest41 and other countries respond to ethical crises by passing 
new laws.42  What is distinctive about the current American mindset is 
the expectation in many quarters that law should address issues relat-
ing to ethics in public life at all levels and in a comprehensive fash-
ion.43 
 
 40 See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004); Michael R. Dimino, Pay 
No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, and 
Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 314–15 (2003) (discussing the evolu-
tion of judicial ethics and restrictions on campaign speech); Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Ethical Foundations of American Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1028 
(2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Ethical Foundations] (“The independence of the Ameri-
can judiciary depends heavily on the ethical standards that prevent or mitigate harm 
to the exercise of judicial judgment by inappropriate pressures flowing from activities 
or relationships involving persons outside the court.”); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical 
Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 811, 814 (1998) (“The [ethical] 
standards differentiating permissible forms of [judicial] political activity from those 
which are forbidden are finely drawn . . . .”); Judge Michael E. Keasler, Ethical Issues 
in Judicial Campaigns, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 991, 992 (2004) (“Under the leadership of 
Chief Justice William Taft and with the aid of Dean Pound of Harvard Law School, 
the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Judicial Ethics were promulgated in 
1924.”). 
 41 See John D. Feerick, Ethics, Lawyers, and the Public Sector: A Historical Overview, in 
ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, 
CLIENTS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 1, 2 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999) [hereinafter Feerick, 
Historical Overview] (opining that “[o]ne cannot read the debates at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 and the state ratifying conventions without concluding 
that the Framers were concerned about the potential for the abuse of power” and 
stating that sections six and nine of article I “[p]lainly . . . illustrate that the Framers 
recognized the potential for conflicts of interest in a democratic government and the 
necessity for provisions to protect government integrity”); id. at 3 (“Threshold re-
quirements for integrity in public office were adopted by the First Congress in the 
creation of the United States Treasury.”). 
 42 See Rodney Brooke, Corruption in Local Government—Some Ethical Issues of the Last 
Twenty-Five Years, in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, 
at 9, 19 (discussing Great Britain). 
 43 For example, consider the detail with which the conduct of American legisla-
tors is regulated in comparison with the rules governing their counterparts in Great 
Britain.  The ethics manual for members of Congress runs more than 200 pages.  See 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 943–88 (5th ed. 2000) (discussing 
Congressional rules of ethics and prosecutions); ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, 
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1992) (324 pages).  
The British House of Commons, up to recent times, has had few “rules governing 
conflicts of interest” and has “preferred to believe that its members could be trusted 
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Government ethics codes are a relatively new innovation.44  Many 
Americans would be surprised, if not dismayed, to learn that in many 
cities the ethics rules are not a clear and coherent document, but ei-
ther non-existent45 or a tangle of disparate provisions that often lack 
coherent themes46 or have serious omissions.47  “Few [municipalities] 
have enacted a code of ethics that provides a simple and comprehen-
sive list of ‘do’s and don’t’s’ for their officers and employees,”48 let 
 
to behave honourably.”  Michael Hunt, Parliament and Ethical Behaviour, in ETHICS IN 
PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 23, 27. 
 44 See Mark W. Huddleston & Joseph C. Sands, Enforcing Administrative Ethics, 537 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 142 (1995) (noting that “only 4 state codes 
predate 1973” and that the “mid-1970s and beyond were particularly fecund years for 
ethics activities because of heightened sensitivity to these issues in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal”); Marx, supra note 38, at 440 (indicating that prior to 1951 no 
body had ever been organized in Arlington County, Virginia, to “delve into the sub-
ject of public ethics”). 
 45 See Anthony Ramirez, Metro Briefing Connecticut: Hartford: Report Criticizes City 
Governments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at B6, available at 2005 WLNR 6559359 
(“Connecticut Common Cause, a government watchdog group[,] . . . found that 69 
of the state’s 169 cities and towns had no ethics codes on the books, and that existing 
codes were vague.”).  Ethics rules passed at the state level are sometimes inapplicable 
to cities that are smaller than a certain size.  See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., Municipal 
Ethical Standards: The Need for a New Approach, 10 PACE L. REV. 107, 108 (1990) (indi-
cating that a 1987 law passed by the New York state legislature was inapplicable to  
more than ninety-five percent of the state’s municipalities that had populations of 
less than 50,000 persons).  See also Editorial, Sheriff Ralph Lopez Shows Bad Judgment, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 22, 2005, at 6B (“State law gives county sheriffs 
complete control over awarding commissary contracts, . . . [but] no ethics policy is in 
place [for Bexar County, Texas] governing how officials interact with contract ven-
dors.”). 
 46 See Mark Davies, The Public Administrative Law Context of Ethics Requirements for 
West German and American Public Officials: A Comparative Analysis, 18 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 319, 324 (1988) (“Ethics laws in this country have proceeded not from a 
comprehensive view of the rights and duties of public officials but largely in reaction 
to specific scandals . . . .”); Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 141 (noting that 
some “jurisdictions that profess to have codes [of ethics] have a jumble of discrete 
legal and administrative instruments, with little if any overarching structure”). 
 47 See Editorial, Putting Yonkers on the Level, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 14WC, at 13 
available at 2005 WLNR 1655826 (stating that during a recent four-year span, New 
York’s fourth largest city “awarded millions of dollars in contracts . . . to top city offi-
cials who run outside businesses, or to their relatives—a problem that existing ethics 
rules do not even address”); Stacey Stowe, Back-Burner Issues Too Hot to Handle, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 14CN, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 9695900 (discussing Con-
necticut’s failure to pass a “bill [that] would have required municipalities to adhere 
to provisions of the state’s ethics code”).  See also Editorial, New Jersey’s Cinderella Gov-
ernor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A28, available at 2004 WLNR 9858976 (referring to 
the challenges posed by “New Jersey’s porous code of ethics”). 
 48 Mark Davies, Article 18 of New York’s General Municipal Law: The State Conflicts of 
Interest Law for Municipal Officials, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (1996) [hereinafter Da-
vies, Conflicts] (“As a result, municipal officials lack guidance as to what they may and 
may not do, and consequently too often fall prey to accusations by self-proclaimed 
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alone a more precise document stating obligations susceptible to le-
gal enforcement.  Published scholarship has also tended to overlook 
how ethical standards for public servants can be implemented by cit-
ies.49  For these reasons, and because of the overriding importance of 
high standards of conduct at the local government level, it is appro-
priate to consider in detail what types of rules should be part of a city 
ethics code and how those rules should be enforced.50 
There are limits on what an ethics code can do to assure the ob-
servance of high standards of conduct.51  Among those limits are the 
inability of language to define precisely all ethical obligations in a po-
tentially vast range of factual settings, the difficulty of integrating 
moral principles with the type of mandatory standards found in 
codes, and the political compromises in the code-adoption process 
that often weaken codified ethical regulations.52  Nevertheless, a well-
 
ethics ‘experts’ of unspecified ‘unethical’ conduct.”).  See also Deborah L. Markowitz, 
A Crisis in Confidence: Municipal Officials Under Fire, 16 VT. L. REV. 579, 592 (1992) 
(“Vermont statutory law provides few clear standards for the conduct of local gov-
ernment officials.”); id. at 595 (discussing “the paucity of municipal codes of ethics” 
in Vermont); William L. Steude, Reflections on Ethics in the Public Sector, PUB. CORP. 
L.Q., Winter 2001, at 1, available at http://www.michbar.org/publiccorp/pdfs/ 
winter01.pdf (discussing a report which found Michigan’s ethics laws “narrow and 
piecemeal, and deficient in having no clearly defined, comprehensive conflict of in-
terest standards”). 
 49 “[T]he professional literature on governmental ethics tends to come from the 
field of public administration . . . and is directed primarily toward bureaucratic eth-
ics, as opposed to the ethics of elected officials.”  Max J. Skidmore, Ethics and Public 
Service, 537 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 27 (1995).  “Until quite recently, 
most academic work on administrative ethics has been rather densely scholastic, 
marked . . . by sweeping philosophical speculation and abstract moral reasoning.”  
Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 140 (“Scholarly articles explaining in clear 
terms how to run an ethical organization have been scarce . . . .”). 
 50 See generally INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPING A LOCAL 
AGENCY ETHICS CODE: A PROCESS-ORIENTED GUIDE (JoAnne Speers ed., 2003), 
http://www.ilsg.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Developing a Lo-
cal Agency Ethics Code: A Process-Oriented Guide” hyperlink) (discussing issues in 
the adoption and implementation process).  A Model Ordinance on Ethics has been 
published by the International Municipal Lawyers Association. See International Mu-
nicipal Lawyers Association, www.imla.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
 51 Gerald S. Reamey, Editorial, Ethics Code Not Hollow Words, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 4, 1998, at 5B (“[E]ven highly skilled wordsmiths and astute stu-
dents of political anthropology fail to anticipate every possible way in which creatively 
unscrupulous people can slide around and through the most tightly knit law.”). 
 52 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 40–46 (2000) (describing limitations of ethics 
codes).  See also Markowitz, supra note 48, at 598 (“[C]odes of ethics are not generally 
designed to address ethical implications of governmental policy and processes be-
cause they involve systemic difficulties which would require radical change in our no-
tions of government accountability.”). 
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drafted ethics code can reflect the best aspirations of a society53 and 
bring to the transaction of public business an important measure of 
consistency, predictability, and fairness.  The work of the public in 
any city of more than minor size is carried out by dozens, hundreds, 
or even thousands of persons.  Some are elected, some appointed, 
some employed.  Even if those individuals are all persons of good 
character,54 the failure to provide clear guidance as to what standards 
of conduct must be observed with respect to such issues as conflict of 
interest, use of city property, acceptance of gifts, and other important 
matters will invite confusion, varying practices, and the appearance of 
impropriety—all of which are harmful to good government. 
Part II of this Article discusses the key rules that should govern 
the conduct of current city officials and employees.  Part III addresses 
the standards that should apply to city officials and employees who 
have left government service.  Part IV considers how disclosure re-
quirements imposed on current city officials and employees or per-
sons doing business with the city can facilitate enforcement of ethics 
rules.  Part V deals with enforcement mechanisms, including the con-
siderations relevant to constituting an ethics review board, adjudicat-
ing allegations of unethical conduct, and imposing sanctions.  Part VI 
explores the role of ethics education in assuring high standards of 
conduct in public life, and in particular considers the functions of 
periodic training and issuance of formal ethics opinions.  Part VII 
concludes that city ethics codes, though expensive and burdensome 
to write and enforce, can make a valuable contribution to public life 
by ensuring fairness to individual citizens, creating a climate condu-
cive to business, and strengthening democratic institutions.  The Ap-
pendix to this Article contains selected ethics code provisions illus-
trating how the concepts discussed in the text may be embodied in 
legal rules. 
II. CURRENT CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES 
To be effective, a city ethics code must have a broad reach.  Its 
terms must apply not only to elected public officials, but to all public 
employees and citizen-volunteers (e.g., appointed members of boards 
 
 53 See Reamey, supra note 51 (stating that if a city “better expresses ‘what is right’ 
and makes clear that ‘right’ counts,” adopting an ethics code is worth the effort.). 
 54 Character plays an in important role in insuring high standards of conduct in 
government and other fields of endeavor.  However, one professor of public admini-
stration has written that “[v]iable notions of character-driven ethics in the public sec-
tor . . . have largely been on hold during the past generation . . . .” Harry W. Rey-
nolds, Jr., Educating Public Administrators about Ethics, 537 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 122, 134 (1995). 
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and commissions) who exercise the power of government.55  Thus, if 
a code is written as imposing obligations on “city officials” and “city 
employees,” it is essential that those terms be carefully defined in the 
code to encompass the full array of governmental actors without limi-
tation.56 
“[O]utright dishonesty has become only one minor aspect of the 
ethical problems facing those in government service . . . [because 
most] ethical dilemmas raise the more subtle questions of conflict of 
interest, self-dealing, and preferential treatment.”57  To address these 
various problems, five types of rules relating to current city officials 
and employees are essential components of an effective local gov-
ernment ethics code.  Those provisions deal with: (1) improper eco-
nomic benefit; (2) unfair advancement of private interests; (3) gifts; 
(4) representation of private interests; and (5) conflicting outside 
employment.  As the list suggests, “[g]overnment ethics laws do not 
regulate ethics per se but rather, as a general rule, regulate financial 
conflicts of interest, that is conflicts between a public official’s [or 
another person’s] private financial interests and public responsibili-
ties.”58  Rules addressing the five named topics and related provisions 
are discussed in the following sections.  Provisions governing these 
types of issues must always be crafted to prevent not only actual im-
propriety, but also the appearance of impropriety, in governmental 
affairs.59 
 
 55 “[I]n many municipalities, unpaid officials, such as members of planning and 
zoning boards, wield the greatest power.”  Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1324–25.  
See also Markowitz, supra note 48, at 581(“Vermont’s local boards consist primarily of 
lay people who volunteer their time.”). 
 56 For example, the term “city official” might be defined as including “the mayor, 
[other specified elected or appointed persons], and [m]embers of all boards, com-
missions . . . , committees, and other bodies created by the [c]ity . . . .”  See SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(u) (containing more detailed defini-
tion).  “City employee” might be defined as “any person listed on the [city] payroll as 
an employee, whether part-time or full-time.” See id. § 2-42(o) (containing more de-
tailed definition). 
 57 Markowitz, supra note 48, at 581. 
 58 Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1322. 
 59 Cf. People v. Gnass, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 237 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating, in 
connection with a criminal prosecution, that “‘our conflict-of-interest statutes are 
concerned with what might have happened rather than merely what actually hap-
pened. . . . They are aimed at eliminating temptation, avoiding the appearance of 
impropriety, and assuring the government of the officer’s undivided and uncom-
promised allegiance. . . . Their objective “is to remove or limit the possibility of any 
personal influence, either directly or indirectly which might bear on an official’s de-
cision . . . .”’”); Cox, supra note 28, at 291 (“Unless used with care, the term ‘appear-
ance standard’ is misleading.  In part, the term is a euphemism sparing those who 
violate the principle the full opprobrium heaped upon one who consciously takes a 
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A. Improper Economic Benefit 
A rule prohibiting the representatives of government from deriv-
ing improper economic benefit from their official conduct is the 
heart of any government ethics code.60  Officials and employees 
should be prohibited from taking any official action that would affect 
their personal financial interests in a manner distinguishable from 
the action’s effect on members of the public in general.61  For pur-
poses of stating this prohibition, the term “official action” should be 
defined to include affirmative acts within the scope of (or in violation 
of) the official or employee’s duties, as well as failure to act when 
there is a duty to act.62 
In cases where the city official or employee’s personal economic 
interests would be affected, the city official or employee should be 
required to step aside and allow another representative of govern-
ment to make a disinterested decision on the matter in question.63  
To ensure that the substitution of an unbiased decision-maker is ef-
fective, the disqualified city official or employee should be required 
 
bribe.  But the case is not simply one of deceptive appearances condemning one who 
appears to do wrong when in fact he is innocent.”). 
 60 Cf.  Feerick, Historical Overview, supra note 41, at 1 (“Theodore Roosevelt noted 
that ‘[t]he first requisite on the citizen who wishes to share the work of public life . . . 
is that he shall act disinterestedly and with a sincere purpose to serve the whole 
commonwealth.’”); Broder, supra note 29, at A1 (quoting U.S. attorney Carol C. Lam 
as stating that the worst thing an elected official can do is enrich himself through his 
position). 
 61 See infra note 254 and accompanying text.  One recent Pennsylvania case raised 
an issue relating to what might be called the differential-impact requirement.  In 
Kraine v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 805 A.2d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002), a 
state ethics law provided that there was no conflict of interest, 
[if the official action in question affected] to the same degree a class 
consisting of the general public or a subclass consisting of an industry, 
occupation or other group which includes the public official or public 
employee, a member of his immediate family or a business with which 
he or a member of his immediate family is associated. 
Id. at 681.  Because the defendant county controller’s husband “received the same 
payment as all other members of his occupation for performing autopsies,” there was 
no preferential treatment and her signature on checks to her husband did not vio-
late the ethics rules.  Id. at 682. 
 62 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(v) (similar provision). 
 63 An ethics code might even require a city official or employee to arrange his or 
her affairs (e.g., investments) so as to minimize the need for recusal.  However, city 
ethics codes generally have not taken that course, presumably because the duty could 
be onerous and difficult to enforce.  But see 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(2) (2004) (stating 
as a general principle that federal executive branch employees “shall not hold finan-
cial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty”); CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(D)(4) (2004) (providing that a “judge shall manage the 
judge’s investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in 
which the judge is disqualified”). 
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to refrain from any further participation in the matter.64  This is 
sometimes referred to as “recusal.”  The disqualified or “recused” in-
dividual should be required to refrain from participating in any dis-
cussion about the matter with any city officials or employees who will 
make the decision or provide advice relevant thereto.65  In order to 
ensure procedural fairness, the recused official or employee should 
also not attend any meeting at which the matter is discussed by other 
decision-makers, for the individual’s presence may intimidate or bias 
the others.66 
To enable neutral third persons to scrutinize whether the terms 
of the rule against improper economic benefit are being observed, 
the disqualified city official or employee should be required to file a 
written statement that is available to the public and the press as an of-
ficial city document.67  The statement should disclose the nature of 
the relationship that prohibits the official or employee from acting 
on the matter in question.  This formal disclosure of the “conflict of 
interest”68 will help to ensure that city officials and employees act with 
an appropriate level of seriousness in observing the recusal provisions 
of the ethics code.  The statement will also enable third persons to 
evaluate whether the prohibition against improper economic benefit, 
and related recusal provisions, are being, or have been, properly ob-
served. 
To be optimally effective, a rule against improper economic 
benefit must be drafted broadly.69  It must prohibit official action that 
 
 64 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(b)(1) (discussing recusal). 
 65 Similarly exacting standards are followed in other areas of the law.  See James P. 
Hill, Scaling the “Chinese Wall”: Rethinking the Conflict of Interest Regulations of the Clean 
Water Act, 74 MICH. B.J. 910, 911 (1995) (“The EPA consistently invokes the ‘Chinese 
wall’ approach . . . that requires individuals with . . . [a] conflict of interest to be fully 
insulated from all . . . decision-making, and insists that it be strictly and vigorously 
enforced.”). 
 66 Cf. Markowitz, supra note 48, at 603–04 (asserting that, to ensure procedural 
fairness, it is “the ethical responsibility of municipal officials . . . to conduct proceed-
ings and to fulfill their other duties with openness and objectivity and to treat all that 
come before them equally”). 
 67 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(b)(2) & (4) (discussing 
disclosure). 
 68 “A conflict of interest develops when [an] official has a second interest which 
appears to be, or actually is, incompatible with the faithful performance of his or her 
official duty.”  See Debra S. Weisberg, Note, Eliminating Corruption in Local Government: 
The Local Government Ethics Law, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 303, 304 (1993). 
 69 See Cox, supra note 28, at 287 (“We speak of public office as a ‘public trust’ be-
cause the same principle lies behind the fiduciary obligations of all private trustees.  
The trustee has undertaken to act for the benefit of others; therefore, he must avoid 
any situation that would or might cause trust decisions to be influenced by anything 
other than the welfare of the beneficiaries.  Because public officials have undertaken 
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affects not only the personal economic interests of the official or em-
ployee, but also the economic interests of persons or entities closely 
connected to the official or employee.  This group would presumably 
include: close relatives;70 other household members (or domestic 
partners); outside employers (either of the city official or employee 
or of persons closely connected to the city official or employee); 
businesses in which the city official or employee (or a closely con-
nected person) owns an interest; and non-profit entities for which the 
city official or employee serves in an officer, director, or other high-
level policy making position.71 
It is easy to envision that a city official or employee might misuse 
official power to further chances of lucrative business opportunities 
or subsequent employment in the private sector.  The rule against 
improper economic benefit should therefore also prohibit official ac-
tion that would benefit the interests of a person or business entity 
from which the city official or employee (or a closely connected per-
son) has recently sought or received an offer of an employment or 
other business relationship.72 
 
to act for the common good, they too must exclude conflicting concerns.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 70 See generally Christopher R. McFadden, Comment, Integrity, Accountability, and 
Efficiency: Using Disclosure to Fight the Appearance of Nepotism in School Board Contracting, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 657, 658 (2000) (discussing the problems created by appointment 
of relatives and asserting that “[t]he appearance of impropriety—even when none 
exists in fact—can weaken the public’s confidence in its government”). 
 71 See generally SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(a) (specifying a 
list of persons or entities considered closely connected to the official or employee).  
A New York model ethics law contains a provision that would expand the list of per-
sons with respect to whose economic interests a city official or employee would not 
be permitted to take official action to include substantial campaign contributors.  See 
Mark Davies, Keeping the Faith: A Model Local Ethics Law—Content and Commentary, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 61, 69 (1993) [hereinafter Davies, Model Local Ethics Law] (“[An] 
officer or employee shall not use his or her official position . . . in a manner which  
. . . may result in a personal financial benefit for . . . (f) a person from whom the offi-
cer or employee has received election campaign contributions of more than $1000 in 
the aggregate during the past twelve months.”).  Such a rule would be good ethics 
and bad politics.  Presumably, this type of provision will be difficult to enact into law.  
Cf. Editorial, Tom Suozzi’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 14LI, at 23, available at 
2004 WLNR 6563623 (urging support for a bill to forbid county officials from solicit-
ing political donations from companies doing business with the county). 
 72 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(a)(9) (stating rule).  Simi-
lar provisions are found in federal law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000) (providing, 
with limited exceptions, that certain federal officers and employees may not act on a 
matter affecting the financial interests of a person with whom the officer or em-
ployee is “negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employ-
ment”). 
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A model rule against improper economic benefit, reflecting the 
concerns discussed in this section, is set forth in Part A-1 of this Arti-
cle’s Appendix. 
B. Unfair Advancement of Private Interests 
The rule against improper economic benefit (discussed above) 
reaches the most egregious cases of misuse of public authority for 
private benefit.  Undoubtedly, it is useful to state those prohibitions 
in the clearest terms (by explicitly banning a city official or employee, 
for example, from taking official action that will economically benefit 
a close family member).  However, the underlying ethical principle is 
broader than the specific cases addressed by the improper economic 
benefit rule.  A city official should be prohibited not merely from act-
ing in a manner that affects the economic interests of himself or her-
self, or closely related persons or entities.  The official or employee 
should also be prohibited from exercising official power to grant any 
person any form of special advantage beyond what is lawfully available 
to all persons.73  This does not mean that no one may be granted a 
benefit by government (e.g., awarded a government contract).  
Rather, it means that all persons should have the right to compete for 
the benefit on the same terms (e.g., by submitting a bid to win a con-
tract in a process where all bids will be evaluated on their merits). 
To put this somewhat differently, “[t]he village clerk may, for 
example, issue a fishing license to her brother”74 and “when a resi-
dent complains to a town board member that the town highway de-
partment blocks the resident’s driveway with snow, the board mem-
ber . . . [may] pursue that complaint with the proper town 
authorities.”75  Everyone has the right to apply for a fishing license or 
to request ordinary “constituent services”76 from elected representa-
tives.  In contrast, it would be improper for an official to direct the 
city streets department to pave a constituent’s driveway, because that 
 
 73 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-44 (stating rule). 
 74 Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 79. 
 75 Id. at 80. 
 76 But see THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 152 (“[P]olitical scientists have shown . . . 
[that] constituent service is not a wholly beneficial practice even when legitimately 
performed. . . . One danger is that as constituent service becomes such a prominent 
part of the job, legislative duties suffer. . . . Another danger is that by concentrating 
on righting wrongs against individual citizens, constituent service can favor particular 
remedies over general reforms. . . . Yet another danger is that to the extent that in-
cumbents gain electoral advantage through constituent service, new members who 
might bring fresh policy views or offer new criticisms of government performance are 
less likely to make their way into the legislature.”). 
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would involve the advancement of private interests by rendering ser-
vices that are not available to the general public.  Similarly, when a 
mayor performs marriages and donates the resulting fees to a chari-
table organization, that conduct is arguably improper because it in-
volves the use of public power for the advancement of particular pri-
vate interests.77 
This underlying ethics principle against unfair advancement of 
private interests should be expressed clearly and expansively, for it is 
the ethical foundation for the idea that there should be a level play-
ing field in public life and that public business should be conducted 
in a manner conducive to confidence in government.78  The rule 
should prohibit not only granting special treatment to any person, 
but also conduct that attempts to do so.  The rule should not only bar 
efforts to advance private interests unfairly, but also conduct that de-
nies (or attempts to deny) any person the same rights that are ac-
corded to others.  Language in an ethics code that prohibits the un-
fair advancement of, or interference with, private interests helps to 
ensure that all persons deal with government on equal footing and 
that no one is unfairly advantaged or obstructed.79 
In connection with the prohibition of unfair advancement of 
private interests, it may be useful to articulate special subsidiary rules 
to address certain types of problems that routinely arise in local gov-
 
 77 Keller v. State Ethics Comm’n, 860 A.2d 659, 660, 668 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) 
(holding that a borough mayor violated a state conflict of interest law when he re-
ceived payments for performing marriages, deposited those funds into his personal 
bank account, and ultimately donated those funds to a charity). 
 78 E.g., Bd. of Selectmen of Avon v. Linder, 227 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Mass. 1967) 
(holding that a statute providing that a member of the board of selectmen shall not 
“use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or ex-
emptions for himself or others or give the appearance of such action” was intended 
“as much to prevent giving the appearance of conflict as to suppress all tendency to 
wrong-doing”). 
 79 However, the appointments process creates a risk that favoritism will still play a 
role in public decisions.  Persons who hold positions in government must be willing 
to act in furtherance of the common good, rather than for the benefit of private in-
terests.  See Laura Mansnerus, A Shadowy Web of State Agencies and Developers, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 14NJ, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 11581247 (“Over the years 
an emerging pattern has fed the already-strong impression that New Jersey’s ethics 
are built on shifting sand: the boards of many independent agencies are populated 
largely by real estate developers, building contractors and representatives of engi-
neering and architecture firms and of energy and utility companies.  And as private 
money intertwines more and more with ambitious redevelopment projects, govern-
ment watchdog groups are growing increasingly suspicious and see the appointment 
process as forging connections between state government and private enterprise.  
‘We put developers on boards who take care of other developers who sit on other 
boards who then take care of them,’ said Jeff Tittel, the director of the state chapter 
of the Sierra Club . . . .”). 
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ernment.  These problems include official action which anticipates 
the reward of a reciprocal favor,80 involves the appointment81 or su-
pervision82 of relatives, or relates to private acquisition by a city offi-
cial or employee of a property interest that is likely to be affected 
(presumably, made more valuable) by impending city action.83  Each 
of these types of conduct should be wholly or generally prohibited. 
A model rule against unfairly advancing or impeding private in-
terests is set forth in Part A-2 of this Article’s Appendix.  The rule 
states the general ethical principle and includes provisions addressing 
the special cases noted above. 
C. Gifts 
There are two dangers created by gifts given to current city offi-
cials and employees.  One risk is that the gifts will, in fact, distort the 
discharge of official duties by biasing officials or employees in favor 
of the interests of the gift givers.84  The other danger is that the gifts 
will be perceived by the public as having a prejudicial effect on the 
performance of city duties, regardless of whether the discharge of du-
ties is actually affected.85  Any rule on gifts must take careful note of 
 
 80 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-44(b)(2) (prohibiting an 
“agreement or understanding” that amounts to a reciprocal favor). 
 81 See id. § 2-44(b)(3) (prohibiting appointment of relatives). 
 82 See id. § 2-44(b)(4) (prohibiting “supervision of a relative within the third de-
gree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity” and providing for reassignment 
or other arrangements to enforce the policy). 
 83 See id. § 2-44(b)(1) (prohibiting acquisition of an interest if the “official or 
employee knows, or has reason to know, that the interest will be directly or indirectly 
affected by impending official action”). 
 84 See Cox, supra note 28, at 291–92 (quoting PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN 
GOVERNMENT 44 (1952)) (“What happens is a gradual shifting of a man’s loyalties 
from the community to those who have been doing him favors.  His final decisions 
are, therefore, made in response to his private friendships and loyalties rather than 
to the public good.  Throughout this whole process the official will claim—and may 
indeed believe—that there is no causal connection between the favors he has re-
ceived and the decisions which he makes.  He will assert that the favors were given 
and received on the basis of pure friendship unsullied by worldly considerations.  He 
will claim that the decisions, on the other hand, will have been made on the basis of 
the justice and equity of the particular case.  The two series of acts will be alleged to 
be as separate as the east is from the west.  Moreover, the whole process may be so 
subtle as not to be detected by the official himself.”). 
 85 See Laura Jesse, Firefighters Face Hearing on Gifts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Jan. 11, 2006, at 1B (quoting the president of a union as stating, in connection with a 
hearing into whether fire department officials violated the city ethics code, “[w]e 
continue to this day to have radio problems, and it gives rise to the question of 
whether we got the best equipment or if this company was chosen because they had 
the better gifts”). 
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this latter point, for the appearance of impropriety is often as de-
structive of public confidence in government as impropriety itself. 
To be effective, a rule relating to gifts must define the term “gift” 
so that it covers not merely benefits conventionally thought of as 
“gifts,” but the transfer of anything of value.86  Otherwise it will be 
simple for anyone who is intent on giving a gift (or a bribe) to cir-
cumvent the narrow terms of the prohibition.87  However, once the 
term “gift” is broadly defined,88 the rule regulating gifts must clearly 
specify which types of “gifts” are unobjectionable, for many transfers 
of money or other things of value are perfectly acceptable.  No ethi-
cal principle is violated when a city official or employee receives a 
small gift from a close family member on a special occasion (e.g., a 
birthday or holiday), or qualifies for a loan from a lending institution 
on the same terms as other members of the public, or accepts a mod-
est protocol gift, not for personal use, but on behalf of the city.  Simi-
larly, there is no reason to bar an official or employee from accepting 
free admission to an event, such as a neighborhood association gath-
ering, that is appropriate for the official to participate in with respect 
to official duties. 
The drafting of a rule relating to gifts requires the exercise of 
considerable care, for questions relating to whether a public official 
or employee may accept gifts (broadly defined) arise in a large city on 
an everyday basis.89  There is a risk that language flexible enough to 
 
 86 Cf. Scaccia v. State Ethics Comm’n, 727 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Mass. 2000) (holding 
that golf and meals were either “entertainment” or “anything of value,” and were 
therefore within the broad definition of “gifts” under a state statute). 
 87 See 2005 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 10, 2005 N.Y. AG LEXIS 11 (Apr. 12, 2005) 
(interpreting the term “gift” under a state ethics law to include donations given to a 
city alderman to pay the legal expenses he incurred by bringing a legal proceeding in 
his individual capacity against another city official). 
 88 A “gift” might be defined in the code as “a voluntary transfer of property (in-
cluding the payment of money) or the conferral of a benefit having pecuniary value 
(such as the rendition of services or the forbearance of collection on a debt), unless 
consideration of equal or greater value is received by the donor.”  SAN ANTONIO 
ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(q).  There is reason to be concerned with even 
small gifts.  “Too many politicians figure they can get away with little things because 
everyone knows you can’t be bought for a free dinner or a plane ride.  That’s how it 
starts. . . . If we all shrug our shoulders and look the other way, the consequences can 
be dire.”  Editorial, Sweat the Cheesy Stuff, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, § 4, at 12, available 
at 2004 WLNR 5584133.  See also Sewell Chan, Transit Leader to Pay Fine in Ethics Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 13492174 (reporting that 
New York City Transit “adopted a 44-page code of ethics that established a ‘zero-
tolerance policy’ toward employees who receive gifts from companies and individuals 
conducting business with the authority” following “a string of alleged ethical lapses”). 
 89 Cf. Steven M. Levin, Note, Illegal Gratuities in American Politics: Learning Lessons 
from the Sun-Diamond Case, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2000) (noting that gift-
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apply to a broad range of situations may invite abuse.  In the United 
States, some ethical provisions relating to gifts create an exception for 
“ordinary social hospitality,” reasoning that such courtesies are not 
improper.90  However, other codes decline to embrace that language, 
fearing that it provides far too little guidance as to what is permitted 
and that the vagueness of the terms will countenance or encourage 
undesirable practices. 
In addition, it is important to consider carefully how far the rule 
against gifts should reach.  Presumably, a city cannot impose gift-
acceptance restrictions on the city official or employee’s family mem-
bers or outside business associates.  However, it may be wise to re-
quire the city official or employee to use his or her best efforts to per-
suade closely related persons or entities not to accept benefits that 
would be improper for the city official or employee to accept.  It may 
also be desirable to oblige officials and employees to disclose to the 
city knowledge of gifts accepted by other closely related persons or 
entities that were given with actual or apparent intent of influencing 
official action. 
A model rule relating to gifts for city officials and employees is 
set forth in Rule A-3 of this Article’s Appendix. 
D. Representation of Private Interests 
Questions frequently arise as to whether it is ethically appropri-
ate for a city official or employee to represent himself or herself, or 
some third person, before other city decision-makers or decision-
making bodies.91  Such representation poses a risk that the party be-
ing represented will receive more favorable treatment than is ac-
corded to other persons, or at least that others will think that the 
party has an unfair advantage. 
 
giving rules can impact the “everyday interaction between public officials and the 
corporations and individuals they represent”).  See also Seth D. Zinman, Judging Gift 
Rules by Their Wrappings—Towards a Clearer Articulation of Federal Employee Gift-
Acceptance Rules, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 142 (1994) (“Writing . . . [ethics] rules is 
not an easy task.  It is not enough that ethics rules reflect sound, wise, and practical 
value judgments.  The success of the entire enterprise depends upon the skill with 
which authors draft these rules.”). 
 90 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(D)(5)(c) (2004). 
 91 As a result, provisions addressing these issues are found in many city ethics 
codes.  See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ETHICS § 303-5(7.a) (2006), available at 
http://cc-codenew.milwaukee.gov/code/volume3/ch303.pdf (regulating compen-
sated representation); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ETHICS § 15.60(d) (2006), avail-
able at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/boards-and-commissions/docs/Ethics-in-
Government.pdf (same). 
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It seems clear that no city official or employee should ever ap-
pear as an advocate (for himself or herself, or anyone else) before the 
governmental board, commission, or office of which he or she is a 
member.  The appearance of favoritism, special advantage, and im-
propriety is far too great in such cases.  In addition, formal appear-
ance92 by a city officer or employee as a representative of private in-
terests before other city decision-makers should normally be rare.  
There is substantial risk that, in acting as a private representative, the 
city officer or employee will improperly lend the prestige of his or her 
public position to the advancement of private interests.  If there are 
cases where such representation is appropriate, they might include 
situations where a city official or employee is acting pro se93 (for his 
or her own benefit, rather than on behalf of another) in the same 
way that all persons are allowed to petition the government on their 
own behalf.  Examples of this type of conduct include a personal ap-
plication for a building permit, a zoning change, or business license. 
A related question concerns whether it is appropriate for a city 
official or employee who is a lawyer to represent private interests in 
litigation against the city.94  Is this type of conduct a violation of some 
duty of loyalty to the government?  In resolving this issue, it may be 
useful to differentiate elected government officials and paid employ-
ees, on the one hand, from volunteer members of city boards and 
commissions, on the other.  Persons in the latter group typically are 
neither paid for their services nor expected to work full-time for the 
government.  It is reasonable to expect a higher degree of loyalty 
from one who is elected to city office or on the payroll than from a 
person who has merely agreed to donate a few hours of service to the 
work of the government on an occasional basis by serving on a board 
or commission.  The rules applicable to citizen-volunteers should be 
crafted carefully so as not to discourage persons from assisting the 
work of government by accepting unpaid, part-time government posi-
tions.  A lawyer engaged in the private practice of law, who could 
bring insight to the work of a board or commission as a volunteer, 
 
 92 There is a difference between formal representation and informal assistance.  
There is ordinarily nothing wrong with an elected official, or his or her staff, per-
forming routine “constituent services” by making a request to a city department to 
act on some request by a constituent.  It is an entirely different matter for the elected 
city official to formally appear before a board or other city body as the designated 
representative of a private individual. 
 93 “Pro se” is a Latin term which means “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; with-
out a lawyer.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004). 
 94 Some codes contain provisions specifically directed toward representation by 
attorneys.  See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-47(d) (addressing repre-
sentation in litigation adverse to the city). 
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might well turn down an offer of appointment if doing so means that 
the lawyer, or his or her professional colleagues,95 must decline repre-
sentation of clients in matters affecting the interests of the city that 
are wholly unrelated to the work of the board.  A city’s legitimate ex-
pectation of loyalty from a citizen-volunteer generally extends no fur-
ther than the scope of the volunteer’s official duties. 
Reasonable minds may differ as to the precise contours of a rule 
to regulate representation of private interests before government de-
cision-makers or in litigation that might have an adverse impact on 
the government.  Nevertheless, it is essential that a city articulate 
clear96 expectations with respect to these matters because disputes 
over what course of conduct is appropriate arise frequently.  It is im-
portant for persons serving as city officials and employees to know 
what is expected of them.  It is equally important for a consistent 
standard to be applied to the review of allegations of misconduct. 
A model rule offering one possible version of provisions govern-
ing the representation of private interests is set forth in Rule A-4 of 
this Article’s Appendix. 
E. Conflicting Outside Employment 
If a city official or employee were permitted to accept outside 
employment relating to his or her official duties, there would be a 
risk that the outside employer would have, or would be perceived to 
have, an advantage in terms of access to information about govern-
ment affairs or an ability to influence government decisions.  For 
these reasons, city officials and employees should ordinarily be pro-
hibited from providing services to an outside employer related to 
their city duties.  In addition, any form of outside employment that 
could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the official or em-
ployee’s independence of judgment or faithful performance of city 
duties should be banned.97 
A model rule addressing these concerns is set forth in Rule A-5 
of this Article’s Appendix. 
 
 95 Under the usual rules of professional conduct, a law firm is treated as a single 
attorney and if one lawyer has a conflict, no lawyer in the firm can handle the matter 
in question.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003). 
 96 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 110 (“Clear and consistent standards are as 
important for local public officials as they are for statewide public officials.”). 
 97 SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-48 (stating rule).  See also 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.101(b)(10) (2004) (stating that federal executive branch employees “shall not 
engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating for em-
ployment, that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities.”). 
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F. Prohibited Contractual Interests 
Certain ethics codes contain language prohibiting some or all 
city officials and employees from holding a financial interest in city 
contracts.98  In terms of their effect, these rules go far beyond the im-
proper economic benefit rule.99  The latter type of rule provides that 
a city official or employee may not personally take official action eco-
nomically benefiting the official or employee or a closely related per-
son or entity.  In contrast, a prohibited contractual interest rule pro-
vides, in effect, that no one in the city may consummate a contract in 
which a city official or employee personally holds a financial interest.  
Such a rule is not designed to identify which officers or employees 
must step aside, but rather which types of transactions may never take 
place.100  There is a world of difference between saying that a particu-
lar person may not participate in a transaction and saying that a par-
ticular transaction may never occur. 
The difficulty with a prohibited contractual interest rule is that it 
may make it inconvenient or expensive for the city to do its busi-
ness.101  A large city may have so many officials and employees that, if 
all or many of them fall within the scope of the rule, their far flung 
financial interests may make it impossible for the city to engage in 
transactions with a wide range of commercial enterprises.102  Similar 
problems can arise in small towns:103 
 
 98 See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE § 2-7-62(L) (2006), available at http://www. 
amlegal.com/library/tx/austin.shtml (“No salaried City official and certain City em-
ployees . . . [specified], and the spouse of each of the above, shall solicit nor propose 
on a contract, enter into a contract or receive any pecuniary benefit from any con-
tract with the City.  This prohibition does not include any employment contract 
which may be authorized for the official, a contract of sale for real property or a con-
tract for services which are available to all citizens.”). 
 99 See supra Part II-A (discussing the improper economic benefit rule). 
 100 One model code contains language that illustrates the rule.  The provision 
states that: 
No [County, City, Town, or Village] officer or employee shall have an 
interest in a contract with the [County, City, Town, or Village] . . . . Any 
contract willfully entered into by or with the [County, City, Town, or 
Village] in which there is an interest prohibited by that section shall be 
null, void, and wholly unenforceable, to the extent provided by . . . law. 
Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 81. 
 101 See Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 183 (“One town in New York had to truck its 
bulk trash (like old washing machines) to another state because the local landfill was 
owned by a member of the town board.”). 
 102 In San Antonio, which has more than 11,000 city officials and employees, the 
contractual-interest prohibition is embodied in expansive language contained in the 
City Charter.  See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO (TEX.) § 141 (2006) (effective 
Jan. 1, 1952), available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/clerk/charter/charter.htm 
(“No officer or employee of the city shall have a financial interest, direct or indirect, 
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In many small, rural communities, members of the legislative body, or 
other elected or appointed officials, may well own the only hardware 
store, gas station, or snow plowing service in the area.  The municipal-
ity must then either ignore the prohibition against contracts with mu-
nicipal officials or obtain the goods and services at a significantly 
higher price from distant vendors.
104
 
Local contractors may also have a better understanding of the mu-
nicipality’s needs or greater willingness to handle small contracts.105  
In addition, in communities that are economically struggling, citizens 
may prefer that public money is spent in a way that supports local 
merchants, rather than those doing business in some other town. 
It may reasonably be asked whether a prohibited contractual in-
terest rule is a necessary component of an ethics code.  In terms of 
substance, perhaps not, if the other rules on improper economic 
benefit and unfair advancement of private interests are followed.  
However, there is still the problem of bad appearances, especially if a 
visible, high-level official or employee has a substantial stake in a con-
tract with the city.  Observers may believe that the transaction is cor-
rupt, even if it is wholly legitimate.  In that sense, the rule on prohib-
ited contract interests avoids the appearance of impropriety.  In 
addition, such a rule may also be convenient.  When a city attorney is 
approached by a council member or other city official or employee 
asking whether a business in which that person holds an interest can 
enter into a contract with the city, it may be useful to flatly answer 
“no.”  This may be more efficient than giving a more equivocal re-
sponse saying that the answer depends on what other city decision-
makers will decide in light of the various rules governing actual or 
apparent impropriety in public affairs.  However, some cities have 
framed a rule which allows the answer to turn on advance disclosure 
of the nature and extent of the financial interest,106 rather than 
 
in any contract with the city, or shall be financially interested, directly or indirectly, 
in the sale to the city of any land, materials, supplies, or service . . . .”).  The city eth-
ics code contains elaborate provisions which construe the charter language and ef-
fectively confine its reach within manageable bounds by stating that it applies only to 
financial interests of certain high-level employees and that only certain types of in-
vestments in entities create a financial interest in the contracts to which the entities 
are parties.  SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-52. 
 103 See Markowitz, supra note 48, at 603 (“In smaller towns, a municipality would 
have a particularly difficult time trying to find volunteers for its boards if service re-
quired volunteers to sever all employment and business connections with the mu-
nicipality.”). 
 104 Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 82. 
 105 Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 114. 
 106 See MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ETHICS § 303-5(6) (2006), available at http://cc-
codenew.milwaukee.gov/code/volume3/ch303.pdf (“No official or other city [em-
ployee], member of an official’s or other city [employee’s] immediate family, nor 
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broadly prohibiting contracts in which an official or employee has a 
financial interest.  In those cities,  
[u]nder the flexible principles of transactional disclosure and 
recusal, as long as municipal officers or employees publicly disclose 
the nature and extent of their interests in a contract and recuse 
themselves from taking any action on it to obtain a benefit for 
themselves or related persons, the contract may be executed and 
their companies may receive payment.107 
G. Other Provisions 
A city ethics code does not operate in a vacuum.  Rather, it 
stands against a backdrop of numerous other provisions that con-
strain the conduct of government officials and employees.  Those 
provisions typically include laws that impose civil and criminal liability 
for various forms of inappropriate activity, such as fraud and theft, 
and personnel rules that guide everyday practices in public life.  In 
addition, laws enacted at a state level to deal with issues such as con-
flicts of interest may be expressly or implicitly applicable to city offi-
cials or employees.108 
A city ethics code may include provisions that go beyond the 
rules discussed above (improper economic benefit, unfair advance-
ment of private interests, gifts, representation of private interests, 
conflicting outside employment, and prohibited contractual inter-
ests).  The code may, for example, address such topics as confidenti-
ality of government information,109 use of public facilities and re-
 
any organization with which the official or other city [employee] or a member of the 
official’s or other city [employee’s] immediate family owns or controls at least 10% of 
the outstanding equity, voting rights, or outstanding indebtedness may enter into any 
contract or lease involving a payment or payments of more than $3,000 within a 12-
month period, in whole or in part derived from city funds, unless the official or other city 
[employee] has first made written disclosure of the nature and extent of such relationship or in-
terest to the board and to the department involved in regard to the contract or lease.  Any con-
tract or lease entered into in violation of this subsection may be voided by the  
city . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
 107 Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 115. 
 108 See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 109 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-46 (stating rule).  A city 
ethics code can define confidential information by reference to the state’s open re-
cords and open meetings laws or the Freedom of Information Act.  See id. § 2-42(k) 
(“‘Confidential government information’ includes all information held by the city 
that is not available to the public under the Texas Public Information Act and any 
information from a meeting closed to the public pursuant to the Texas Open Meet-
ings Act, unless disclosure is permitted under the Open Meetings Act.”).  Even some 
early government-ethics codes recognized the importance of confidentiality.  See The 
City Manager’s Code of Ethics, 27 NAT’L MUNICIPAL REV. 546 (1938) (quoting the 1938 
revision of a 1924 code as stating that “personal aggrandizement or personal profit 
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sources,110 political activity by officials and employees (on the job or 
off-duty),111 or supervision of subordinates (to ensure that their con-
duct, too, complies with applicable ethical standards).112  Model rules 
addressing these concerns are set forth in Rules A-6 to A-9 of this Ar-
ticle’s Appendix.  Whether an ethics code needs to address any of 
these or other subjects113 depends upon whether the matters in ques-
tion are adequately covered by other existing laws and personnel 
regulations. 
An issue of particular importance is the question of whether an 
ethics code should include provisions to deal with discrimination.114  
A city official or employee who manifests discriminatory bias or 
prejudice in official conduct brings the city into disrepute, and the 
conduct may deny the victim equal treatment by the government.  A 
decision on whether a building permit will be issued or police protec-
tion will be provided should not depend upon whether the citizen in 
need is black, or Jewish, or Hispanic, or elderly, or gay, or poor, or an 
immigrant.  It is fair to argue that because a city should observe the 
highest ethical standards in the performance of official duties, an 
anti-discrimination provision should be included in a city ethics code.  
One early aspirational (rather than legally enforceable) city man-
ager’s code of ethics contained such language.115  However, most city 
ethics codes today contain no provision against discrimination.  Pre-
 
secured by confidential information or by misuse of public time is dishonest”).  The 
use of confidential government “information for private gain usually means that tax-
payers will pay more than they should to procure supplies and services.”  Feerick et 
al., supra note 45, at 125. 
 110 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-49. 
 111 See, e.g., id. § 2-50.  See also Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 75 
(“Political solicitation of subordinates by an official fosters the appearance, if not the 
reality, of coercion.”). 
 112 SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-53 (stating rule relating to con-
tract personnel). 
 113 Some city ethics handbooks contain provisions relating to software use and e-
mail policies.  See THE CITY OF PHOENIX ETHICS HANDBOOK 10–11 (2005), available at 
http://phoenix.gov//AGENCY/PHXPERSON/ethics.pdf.  While it may be appro-
priate to include those subjects in educational materials for city officials and employ-
ees, they may not need to be addressed in a city ethics code, since personnel rules 
typically cover such matters. 
 114 The rules applicable to federal executive branch employees provide that 
“[e]mployees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity 
for all Americans regardless of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
handicap.”  5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(13) (2004). 
 115 The City Manager’s Code of Ethics, supra note 109, at 546 (“The city manager 
handles all matters of personnel on the basis of merit.  Political, religious, and racial 
considerations carry no weight in appointments, salary increases, promotions, and 
discipline in the municipal service.”). 
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sumably, this is because discrimination is now extensively addressed 
by other laws and personnel regulations.  The City of Houston is a 
notable exception; its ethics code contains a brief anti-discrimination 
rule.116  If an anti-discrimination provision was to be included in a city 
ethics code, it might be patterned on anti-discrimination rules found 
in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.117  Of course, that would set a 
very high standard, for judges are subject to what are typically the 
most demanding ethical standards in American public life.118 
Presumably all ethics codes should contain provisions imposing 
on city officials and employees (and others) duties that relate to the 
 
 116 HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-3(a)(7) (2006), available at 
http://www.houstontx.gov/codes/chapters16to20.html (providing that no city offi-
cial shall “[e]ngage in or promote ideas and/or actions that would demean and de-
fame any particular ethnic group, racial minority group, special interest group 
and/or religious group”). 
 117 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3(B)(5) & (6) (2004).  Borrow-
ing from those provisions, an ethics rule on discrimination might read: 
     (a) General Rule.  City affairs must be conducted without bias or 
prejudice.  A city official or employee shall not, in the performance of 
official duties, manifest by words or conduct bias or prejudice toward 
any person, group, or entity, including bias or prejudice based upon 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or 
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit others subject to his or her 
direction and control to do so. 
     (b) Exceptions.  A city official or employee is not liable under sub-
section (a) for: (1) conduct undertaken in good faith (i) to implement 
an existing city policy or (ii) to carry out the direction of a superior; or 
(2) conduct involving the legitimate advocacy of a position relating to 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or 
socioeconomic status (i) in litigation or similar proceedings or (ii) in-
cidental to the formation of city policy. 
     (c) Definitions.  For purposes of this section: 
(1) “Words or conduct” manifesting “bias or prejudice” in-
cludes, but is not limited to, physical abuse, verbal abuse, 
threats, intimidation, harassment, coercion, assault, stalking, 
hate speech, and other conduct that threatens or endangers the 
health or safety of any person. 
(2) “Good faith” means that the city official or employee has a 
reasonable basis for believing, and does believe, that the con-
duct in question is lawful and not discriminatory. 
(3) “Legitimate advocacy” means that the position espoused is 
not frivolous. 
In 1997, the Mayor’s Task Force on Ethics in Government unanimously endorsed the 
inclusion of this language in the San Antonio Ethics Code.  However, in the political 
process leading to the adoption of a new code in 1998, the language was deleted on 
the ground that other city rules adequately addressed these concerns. 
 118 Keasler, supra note 40, at 992 (“There are many reasons why judges should be 
held to a . . . higher standard than other public officials, and it has to do with what 
judges do. . . . [W]e pass judgment on other people.”). 
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conduct of others.119  Those rules should prohibit anyone from assist-
ing or inducing another to violate the code, for such forms of con-
certed action typically give rise to concerted-action liability in other 
areas of the law.120  The rules should also ban a government official or 
employee from seeking to accomplish what is forbidden by the code 
by acting through the conduct of another.121 
A model rule imposing liability on city officials or employees for 
conduct relating to the actions of others is set forth in Rule A-10 of 
this Article’s Appendix.  The provisions relating to conduct of ordi-
nary citizens should be stated in a part of the ethics code not limited 
to the obligations of current city officials and employees.122 
III. FORMER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES 
A. Representation of Private Interests 
Citizens are often deeply cynical when former city officials and 
employees represent private interests in dealings with the city gov-
ernment.123  The citizens suspect, sometimes rightly, that the former 
city officials and employees are trading on their connections with 
those still in government service, and that the private interests they 
represent will have an unfair advantage in achieving the results they 
seek.124 
 
 119 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-51 (stating rule). 
 120 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (discussing concerted-
action liability in tort law). 
 121 Similar provisions can be found in other ethics codes.  See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2002) (providing that it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to violate the rules “through the acts of another”). 
 122 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-72 (providing that “[n]o per-
son shall intentionally or knowingly induce, attempt to induce, conspire with, aid or 
assist, or attempt to aid or assist another person to engage in conduct violative of the 
obligations imposed” by various provisions of the code). 
 123 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 127 (“Such behavior . . . raises questions 
about the true motivations behind the official acts of a public servant.  Were his votes 
and actions taken while in office prompted by the best interests of the government or 
by a desire to attract future employment and clients?”). 
 124 E.g., Editorial, The Capitol’s Revolting Door, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A26, 
available at 2005 WLNR 17834711 (discussing “Washington’s ever-whirring carousel 
for business lobbyists and government appointees, who spin back and forth between 
the private and public sectors in a blur of opportunism”). 
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To preserve confidence in local government,125 a city ethics code 
must address the issue of when and under what circumstances a for-
mer city official or employee may represent private interests before 
the government.  However, such rules must be written with particular 
care.  The rules should not be so stringent that they discourage per-
sons from entering government service in the first place.126  The rules 
should also not demand an unrealistically high degree of continuing 
“loyalty” from persons who served the government.  A rule broadly 
prohibiting a former city official or employee from using any skills or 
non-confidential knowledge acquired while in government service 
would certainly go too far.127  That type of provision would discourage 
qualified persons from ever working for the government.128  The rules 
governing conduct by former city officials and employees should 
prohibit only those forms of post-government-service conduct that 
pose a serious risk of real or apparent unfair advantage.129 
In drafting rules limiting the conduct of former city officials and 
employees, it is important to consider several variables.  The first con-
sideration is whether the prior government service was rendered by a 
person who was (a) an elected official, (b) an employee, or (c) an 
unpaid volunteer.  Presumably, a higher degree of continuing loyalty 
can be expected from a former elected office-holder, or perhaps even 
a former paid employee, than from a mere former volunteer.  One 
might also conclude that it is fair to impose greater obligations on 
former full-time employees than on former part-time employees,130 
 
 125 See Cox, supra note 28, at 288 (“The public will not give the necessary trust to 
those who present government as the place where one feathers his own nest, ex-
changes favors with friends and former associates, and takes good care of those who 
will reward them.”). 
 126 This is especially true in rural settings.  See Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 181 
(“[S]mall communities depend heavily upon volunteers for municipal officials, who 
meet only monthly, who are independent but sometimes not terribly sophisticated, 
who are known by everyone in the community, [and] who cherish their privacy . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 127 Similar broad restrictions on the conduct of lawyers after leaving a law firm 
have been held to be invalid.  See Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by 
Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 1, 113 n.514 (1988) (discussing a District of Columbia ethics opinion). 
 128 Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 181 (“[B]road ‘revolving door’ restrictions will 
probably keep some of the best people out of local government . . . .”). 
 129 Id. at 181 (noting that when “ethics laws become so onerous . . . [they] foster 
bad government”). 
 130 Feerick, Historical Overview, supra note 41, at 4 (quoting a report stating, with 
respect to federal government ethics rules, that “‘it is safe, proper and essential from 
the viewpoint of recruitment, [that] the statutes should differentiate in treatment 
between regular employees and citizens who serve the Government only intermit-
tently, for short periods, as advisors and consultants.’”). 
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although apparently few codes have drawn such a distinction.  A for-
mer unpaid volunteer should have a less restrictive duty of continu-
ing loyalty than one who was previously elected to office or on the city 
payroll. 
A second variable is the nature of the conduct in which the for-
mer city official or employee will engage after leaving government 
service.  Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether the subsequent repre-
sentation of private interests is (1) pro se, (2) on behalf of others, but 
unremunerated, or (3) on behalf of third persons who pay for the 
services.  Self-representation may not be highly objectionable, par-
ticularly if other persons in the community have the same right.  In 
contrast, compensated representation of private interests, particularly 
if it occurs frequently, may pose a great risk to public confidence in 
government because it may appear that the former official or em-
ployee is deriving improper economic benefit from connections to 
persons still in government.  Unremunerated subsequent representa-
tion of private interests as a volunteer would seem to be less objec-
tionable than compensated work, but it may still pose an appearance 
of impropriety on the ground that the persons being represented 
seem to have (or actually do have) an advantage based on the former 
city official or employee’s real or perceived relationship to current 
city decision-makers or special knowledge about how to obtain suc-
cessful results. 
A third relevant variable is the amount of time that has elapsed 
since the former city official or employee was in government service.  
It might, for example, be highly objectionable for a former city coun-
cil member to begin representing private interests to the government 
immediately after leaving public service.  However, as the years pass, 
the real or perceived connections of the former public servant to 
those who represent the government often diminish (although that is 
not always true).131  Therefore, it may be appropriate to design a pro-
hibition imposing limitations on post-government representation of 
private interests that expires after a certain number of years have 
elapsed.  Of course, there is no easy answer to the question of 
whether such a prohibition should last one year, two years, five years, 
or seven years, as opposed to ten years, twenty years, or a lifetime.  
 
 131 Cf. Beth Barrett, Calendars Show Frequent Private Meetings with Reps, DAILY NEWS 
OF L.A., Jan. 8, 2006, at N21, available at 2006 WLNR 484681 (discussing a former 
councilman who had “long friendships with the council members” and was part of 
“an interconnected web of influence at City Hall”). 
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Most cities seem to impose a one- or two-year limitation.132  Such a 
brief restriction is only a small step toward preserving citizen confi-
dence in government and may be more a reflection of what is politi-
cally feasible, than what is desirable.  A rule that contains a time limi-
tation will obviously be subject to debate on the issue of whether the 
period of time is too long or too short for the purpose of ensuring 
fairness and a level playing field in city government decision-making 
processes.133 
Finally, it may be appropriate to consider the closeness of the 
connection between the subject matter of the former official or em-
ployee’s prior responsibilities in government service and the subse-
quent representation of private interests.134  Presumably, the closer 
the connection, the greater the risk that the private party will be per-
ceived to have (or actually will have) an unfair advantage, and the 
greater the justification for banning such work.  A rule that focuses 
on the nexus between the prior government service and the subse-
quent representation will inevitably impose a wide range of limita-
tions on persons who previously exercised broad authority for the 
city, such as a mayor or city council member, and a lesser range of 
limitations on persons who previously played a minor role in city af-
fairs.  That may be appropriate.  State and federal laws commonly 
prohibit former public servants from “lobbying former agencies on 
matters in which the official or employee was involved.”135 
Aside from the foregoing general considerations, there is an-
other issue relating to government ethics rules that purport to con-
strain the conduct of attorneys.  In Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics 
Commission,136 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a state eth-
ics law which provided that “[n]o former public official or public 
 
 132 See Jennifer Medina, Officials Laud New Ethics Code in Yonkers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2005, at B6, available at 2005 WLNR 18365889 (discussing a new city ethics code 
approved by the voters which “prevents former city officials from lobbying for one 
year after they leave office” and “bars former officials from lobbying at all on issues 
they worked on while in office”); SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §12.10.030 (2006), 
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanjose_ca/ (one-year restriction); SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-56(a) and (b) (stating two-year restric-
tions). 
 133 See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, Majority Backing Ethics Proposals, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 16, 1998, at 7B (describing a council member who questioned 
whether proposed two-year and seven-year limitations were too restrictive). 
 134 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2002) (limiting former-client con-
flict-of-interest restrictions on attorneys to cases where the new matter is the same or 
“substantially related” to the prior representation of a different client). 
 135 Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 142–43. 
 136 833 A.2d 123 (Pa. 2003). 
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employee shall represent a person, with promised or actual compen-
sation, on any matter before the governmental body with which he 
has been associated for one year after he leaves that body.”137  The 
court held that as applied to attorneys, the provision was unconstitu-
tional under the state constitution, which provides that the state su-
preme court has the exclusive authority to regulate the conduct of an 
attorney insofar as it constitutes the practice of law.138  Whether other 
 
 137 Id. at 124 n.1 (quoting Public Official and Employee Ethics Act, 65 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1103(g) (West 2000)). 
 138 Id. at 132.  The court wrote: 
The provision seeks to prevent a former government employee from 
representing any person before his or her government employer for 
one year after the termination of their employment relationship.  The 
Ethics Act defines “represent” as “[t]o act on behalf of any other per-
son in any activity which includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
personal appearances, negotiations, lobbying and submitting bid or 
contract proposals which are signed by or contain the name of a for-
mer public official or public employee.”  While it is conceivable that a 
non-attorney could engage in such “representation” and, therefore, 
Section 1103(g) is not strictly limited in scope to attorneys, it nonethe-
less targets the practice of law. 
     Accordingly, we find Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act unconstitu-
tional, as violative of Article V, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, to the extent that Section 1103(g) applies to former government 
employees who are also attorneys.  We do not question the policy un-
derpinning Section 1103(g).  We recognize the sound rationale for 
prohibiting a former government employee from “represent[ing] a 
person, with promised or actual compensation, on any matter before 
the governmental body with which he has been associated for one year 
after he leaves that body.”  However, the state legislature is not the 
body vested with the power to enact such a restriction; that authority 
lies with this Court through the promulgation of the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination 
that the limitations on an attorney’s subsequent representation would be defined by 
the code of ethics applicable to attorneys has the potential for entirely changing the 
analysis of what types of conduct are permissible when an attorney leaves government 
service.  For example, state ethics codes regulating the conduct of attorneys who pre-
viously served as public officers or employees do not frame limitations on subsequent 
representation in terms of the passage of time.  For example, the applicable Pennsyl-
vania rule provides that: 
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has for-
merly served as a public officer or employee of the government: shall 
not otherwise represent a private client in connection with a matter in 
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public 
officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives 
its informed consent to the representation. 
PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11.  The rule is broader than the challenged state 
ethics rule in lacking a time limitation, but narrower in terms of imposing a “person-
ally and substantially” participated requirement.  The Shaulis decision leaves many 
unanswered questions and creates the possibility that Pennsylvania attorneys may en-
JOHNSON FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  2:40:32 PM 
2006] ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 749 
courts would reach the same conclusion is doubtful.  Decisions in 
New York139 and Florida140 have reached contrary results.  Neverthe-
less, it is important to note that such separation-of-powers considera-
tions may limit the reach of a government ethics code that purports 
to constrain an attorney’s subsequent representation of private inter-
ests. 
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, the formulation of a rule 
governing whether it is permissible for former city officials and em-
ployees to represent private interests after leaving government service 
is one of the greatest challenges in writing an ethics code.  Moreover, 
if the code is adopted at the city level (rather than imposed on the 
city by a higher governmental body),141 there will be great resistance 
to enacting demanding rules to govern the conduct of former offi-
cials and employees because those rules will presumably apply to the 
persons who vote on them once they leave government service.142  A 
model rule offering one possible version of provisions governing the 
representation of private interests is set forth in Rule B-1 of this Arti-
cle’s Appendix. 
B. Employment Relating to a City Contract 
Similar issues arise concerning whether it is permissible for a 
former city official or employee to be employed by a private party to 
 
gage in the type of representation of private interests that would be deemed to create 
an impermissible appearance of impropriety, if engaged in by other persons. 
 139 Forti v. N.Y. State Ethics Comm’n, 554 N.E.2d 876, 885 (N.Y. 1990) (explaining 
that New York’s revolving door law “is not directed specifically at admitted attorneys 
but rather is aimed at all former executive branch employees [and] [i]ts effect on 
the practice of law is, thus, merely incidental”). 
 140 See Howard v. State Comm’n on Ethics, 421 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982) (in finding that a state statute prohibited a lawyer from serving as school board 
attorney, the court stated that “[t]he [revolving door] statutes enacted by the legisla-
ture merely supplement the Canons of Professional Responsibility adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  When an attorney decides to accept public employment, he does so 
subject to the legislative proscription on his conduct.”). 
 141 See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 142 Of course, it would be possible to draft a rule that would be applicable only to 
officials first elected or appointed after the effective date of the new provisions.  But 
no official with sufficient character to champion tighter ethics rules would vote for 
such delayed implementation, and any official who did would be risking well 
founded public criticism.  When San Antonio adopted a new ethics code in Novem-
ber 1998, it took effect on January 1, 1999, except as to former city officials and em-
ployees whose official duties terminated before that date.  SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, 
supra note 16, § 2-93(b).  Between the passage of the law and its effective date, city 
officials and employees were given notice that if they did not want to be bound by 
the more stringent provisions of the new code, they needed to leave government ser-
vice before January 1, 1999.  Id. 
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perform work relating to a contract between the private party and the 
city.  If there is a close connection between the former city official or 
employee’s previous duties and the contract, and if only a short time 
has passed, it may appear that the official or employee has “switched 
sides,”143 to the government’s detriment.  Perceptions of side-
switching create a risk that a private party will be viewed as having an 
unfair advantage in dealing with the government.  For example, a 
person who, while in government service, participated in the negoti-
ating, drafting, or awarding of a contract may know what weaknesses 
the document contains with respect to protecting the government’s 
interests.  Former city officials and employees should, therefore, be 
prohibited from performing work relating to a contract they helped 
to negotiate, draft, or award, at least until a certain period of time has 
elapsed.144 
A model rule governing work relating to a city contract is set 
forth in Rule B-2 of this Article’s Appendix. 
C. Other Provisions 
It may be appropriate for a city ethics code to contain other pro-
visions relating to the conduct of former city officials or employees.  
For example, if the code contains a confidentiality rule applicable to 
current city officials or employees, it should indicate to what extent 
those confidentiality obligations carry forward after the official or 
employee leaves government service.145 
Rule B-3 of the Appendix contains a provision establishing a 
continuing duty not to use or disclose confidential information ob-
tained while working for the government. 
 
 143 “Side-switching” is deplored in many areas of the law.  See Vincent R. Johnson, 
The Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class Members, 17 REV. LITIG. 497, 517 (1998) 
(discussing side-switching) (citing Timothy D. Howell, So Long “Sweetheart”—State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest 
in a Line of Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 66–70 (1997)) (discussing 
how shifting positions of parties distort litigation).  In Texas, for example, a lawyer 
may not challenge the validity of a document he or she drafted.  See TEX. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.09(a)(1), as reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (stating that a lawyer shall not 
question “the validity of the lawyer’s services or work product for the former client”).  
In Washington, legal malpractice claims cannot be assigned because assignment 
would risk encouraging collusion with respect to stipulation of damages in the un-
derlying litigation and would condone “abrupt and shameless shift of positions.”  
Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1077 (Wash. 2003). 
 144 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-56 (a)–(b) (containing a two-
year limitation). 
 145 E.g., id. § 2-55 (stating rule). 
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IV. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
A. Periodic Reporting by City Officials and Employees 
The enforcement of ethics rules applicable to current city offi-
cials and employees may be greatly aided by imposing an obligation 
on some subset of high-level city decision-makers to file (and, when 
necessary, update) annual reports containing information relating to 
the various provisions of those rules.146  For example, reporting re-
quirements mirroring provisions in the improper economic benefit 
rule147 may require the filer to disclose: the names of closely related 
persons; other household members; outside employers; businesses in 
which the filer (or a closely related person) holds an economic inter-
est; other affiliated businesses; and persons from whom the filer has 
received or sought an offer of employment or business opportunities.  
The requirement may also mandate the revelation of the filer’s 
sources of outside income (above a threshold amount), the addresses 
of real property owned by the filer (or by a closely related person) in 
the city (or, perhaps, in the county or state), the names of any person 
or entity to whom the filer is indebted (above a threshold amount), 
the name of any person from whom the filer received a gift (above a 
threshold amount) and perhaps the gift’s estimated fair market value, 
and information related to any gift received by the filer on behalf of 
the city.148 
If the reported information is a public record available to the 
press and other interested parties, and if violation of the reporting 
rules are backed by appropriate sanctions, it is likely that accurate in-
formation will be disclosed.  The reporting requirements’ periodic 
 
 146 Id. § 2-74 (detailing contents of financial disclosure reports); Davies, Model Lo-
cal Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 90–97 (discussing various disclosure requirements). 
 147 See supra Part II-A. 
 148 Although the improper economic benefit rule should be drafted so as to pro-
hibit official action that is likely to affect the economic interests of clients, see supra 
Part II-A, it is probably best not to require disclosure of the names of clients in an 
annual disclosure form.  That requirement might be unduly burdensome because of 
the number of persons who qualify as clients and because of the difficulty (or at least 
tediousness) of distinguishing “clients” with whom one has a “highly personalized” 
relationship, see SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(c)(2), from mere 
customers.  In addition, it might be argued that outside professionals (such as attor-
neys) who serve as volunteer board members, and who owe their clients fiduciary du-
ties of disclosure, would have a duty to inform their clients that their identity was be-
ing disclosed on a city document that would become a public record.  See generally 
Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737 
(2003) (discussing disclosure obligations of lawyers).  In some instances, under ap-
plicable professional standards, the identity of the client might be confidential. 
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nature will mean that, in many instances, the information will be re-
ported at a time when there is no special reason to hide the informa-
tion, since the annual deadline for filing the report may not be the 
moment when the filer is tempted to take official action that would 
result in economic benefit to a related person or entity.  Further-
more, the obligation to report periodically in a public document in-
formation related to enforcement of the ethics rules will remind the 
filer of the obligations imposed by the rules.149  That reminder may 
reduce the number of instances of inadvertent non-compliance with 
the code.150  Annual disclosure also makes it easier for other parties to 
monitor whether ethics rules are being observed.151  Compliance with 
the periodic reporting rule can itself be ensured by providing that a 
designated city office shall notify filers of the deadline, provide suit-
able reporting forms, and make appropriate reports of non-
compliance.152 
The burdens related to collecting and distributing reported in-
formation can be minimized by limiting the reporting obligation to 
city officials and employees who hold high-level positions, rather than 
imposing those obligations on all city officials and employees.153  In 
addition, the burden on the individual filer can be reduced by allow-
ing the filer to submit a short form report in a reporting period for 
which there have been few or no changes to previously requested in-
formation.154  Care must be taken to ensure that filing requirements 
are not so burdensome or intrusive into private affairs as to discour-
age persons from entering public service.155  Thus, for example, while 
it may make sense to require disclosure of offers of employment or 
business opportunities that were received or accepted during the 
prior reporting period, it might be unrealistic to require disclosure of 
 
 149 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 117 (suggesting that disclosure requirements 
prompt public officials to remove themselves from matters of self-interest). 
 150 Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 178 (“[T]he vast majority of conduct that is un-
ethical under the law results from employees’ ignorance of what the law is.”). 
 151 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 118 (discussing an instance where an annual 
disclosure requirement would have established whether a supervisor in fact was a 
partner of a consultant who was awarded a contract). 
 152 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-73(e) (imposing such duties 
on the City Clerk and indicating that a report of non-compliance shall be forwarded 
to the Ethics Review Board for appropriate action). 
 153 E.g., id. § 2-73(a) (discussing persons required to file; the list includes candi-
dates for city council). 
 154 Id. § 2-75 (discussing short form annual report). 
 155 See Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 185 (“In New York State almost 300 county 
volunteer board members resigned when lengthy financial disclosure became effec-
tive.”). 
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instances in which the city official or employee solicited an offer of 
employment or a business opportunity.156  Similarly, while it might be 
reasonable to require disclosure of the names of parents, children, 
siblings, or a spouse on an annual form, requiring disclosure of the 
name of every relative within the second degree of consanguinity or 
affinity might impose an unwarranted data assembly burden.  Rea-
sonable disclosure requirements do not significantly hamper the abil-
ity of government to attract qualified persons to public service.157 
The effectiveness of periodic reporting requirements depends 
upon public and governmental scrutiny of the reported information.  
The information should be maintained in a systematic fashion and 
must be available to interested persons on a timely basis.  Ideally, a 
web-based format should be used for collecting information from fil-
ers and allowing it to be accessed and searched by the public.158 
B. Disclosures by Persons Doing Business with the City 
Compliance with substantive ethical rules may also be facilitated 
by requiring persons doing business with the city to disclose relevant 
information.  For example, a party seeking to be awarded a discre-
tionary contract159 may be obliged to provide to the city information 
about the identity of any individual or entity that would be a party to 
the contract160 or any facts known by the bidder which make it rea-
sonably likely that any particular member of a board or other city 
body would violate the improper-economic-benefit rule by participat-
ing in official action relating to the contract bid.161  These obligations 
 
 156 Cf. SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, §§ 2-43(a)(9), 2-74(g) (requiring 
recusal from matters involving persons from whom the official or employee solicited 
employment during the prior year, but not revelation of that information on the an-
nual financial disclosure report ). 
 157 Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 116 (discussing testimony indicating that New 
York municipalities that required annual disclosure “found no . . . wide-scale loss of 
people interested in public service”); id. at 117 (concluding that “experience shows 
that there has been no deterrent effect on employees of local government” because 
of disclosure requirements in various states). 
 158 Cf. Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 186 (“Electronic filing is . . . not merely the 
wave of the future; it is the only future for annual disclosure.”).  However, identity 
theft is an increasing social problem, and there may be reasons not to store certain 
types of personal information on computers connected to the web.  See generally Vin-
cent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. 
REV. 255 (2005) (discussing identity theft). 
 159 A “discretionary contract” is “any contract other than those which by law must 
be awarded on a low or high qualified bid basis.  See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra 
note 16, § 2-42(m). 
 160 Id. § 2-59 (requiring disclosure of parties, owners, and closely related persons). 
 161 Id. § 2-60 (requiring disclosure of association with city officials or employees). 
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can then be enforced through codified provisions stating that the vio-
lator may be barred from future contracting with the city (presuma-
bly for a period of years)162 or that a contract awarded to a party who 
violated the disclosure obligations may be voided at the city’s op-
tion.163 
V. ENFORCEMENT 
A. Review of Complaints 
An effective ethics code must provide an administrative mecha-
nism for reviewing complaints of allegedly unethical conduct and de-
termining whether a sanction should be imposed.164  Some have also 
argued that “[e]thics laws for municipal officials must be enforced lo-
cally”165 because the “principles of home rule, the limits of the State 
budget, and the greater knowledge of local officials and citizens 
about their own needs mandate that the State intervene in the en-
forcement of ethics laws only when local enforcement fails.”166 
Enforcement procedures may take many forms.167  However, 
three considerations are critical.  First, the accused must be given no-
tice of the charges and a fair opportunity to respond.  Second, the ul-
timate decision-maker must be insulated from political and other in-
appropriate pressures.  Third, the process must operate with 
sufficient transparency that the public may be confident that the 
process is legitimate. 
Due process concerns relating to notice and hearing168 might be 
satisfied in any number of ways.  Whether the accused should enjoy a 
right to representation by legal counsel, to direct confrontation of his 
 
 162 Id. § 2-87(f)(3) (discussing disqualification from contracting). 
 163 Id. § 2-87(f)(4) (discussing voiding or ratification of a contract). 
 164 Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1343–44 (“A municipality is well advised to 
exercise its home rule powers to establish an independent ethics board with mem-
bers having fixed terms and the power and duty to investigate violations of the local 
code of ethics, hold hearings, impose civil fines, issue advisory opinions, give advice 
on the code, and supervise proper ethics training for all officers and employees of 
the municipality.”). 
 165 State of N.Y., Temp. State Comm’n on Local Gov’t Ethics, Final Report, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 7 (1993). 
 166 Id. 
 167 See generally SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, §§ 2-80 to -91 (discussing 
the city’s ethics review board); Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 106–21 
(similar discussion of ethics review board). 
 168 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a person’s 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the govern-
ment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”). 
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or her accuser, or to cross-examination of witnesses are matters as to 
which reasonable minds may differ.  City governments typically oper-
ate on tight budgets, and the resources available for the review of eth-
ics complaints may be scarce.169  Moreover, to the extent that the 
process depends upon the assistance of citizen-volunteers to staff 
what might be called an ethics review board, it is imperative to re-
member that the time they can devote to such matters may be lim-
ited, even though the matters are highly important to the city.  In de-
signing the procedures relating to the conduct of hearings, there may 
be good reason to favor a streamlined European inquisitorial form of 
proceeding over the more elaborate, and potentially more time con-
suming and expensive, American model of adversarial justice.170  By 
the same token, it may be more efficient to allow a large ethics review 
board to operate in panels of three or five board members,171 rather 
than in an en banc format in which every member of the board par-
ticipates in the hearing and disposition of every case.  In some situa-
tions, the use of joint or regional review boards may be appropriate.172  
In many respects, making an enforcement process efficient means 
that it must be “inexpensive and flexible.”173 
Charges of ethical wrongdoing by city officials or employees ob-
viously take place in a highly political context.  Politics, however, is 
not conducive to the fair and impartial resolution of ethics com-
plaints.  It is therefore of the highest importance to vest final174 deci-
sion-making authority in persons who are insulated from political 
 
 169 But see Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1344 ( “[A] comprehensive ethics 
compliance program need not cost much, and the advantages of protecting public 
servants against unjustified attacks and in increasing public confidence in the integ-
rity of municipal government can be substantial.”). 
 170 For a comparison of the inquisitorial and adversarial models, see McNeil v. Wis-
consin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes a system adversarial rather than 
inquisitorial is not the presence of counsel . . . but rather, the presence of a judge 
who does not (as the inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation 
himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con ad-
duced by the parties.”). 
 171 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-85 (providing for ethics pan-
els). 
 172 State of N.Y., Temp. State Comm’n on Local Gov’t Ethics, supra note 165, at 8 
(suggesting also that in some cases it may be appropriate to cast the administrative 
burden on the state). 
 173 Id. at 8. 
 174 Although for purposes of the city’s involvement the decision may be “final,” 
the person found to have violated the code may have a right to judicial review of the 
decision.  Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 119 (containing a “model” 
provision indicating that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the Ethics Board 
may seek judicial review and relief pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law 
and Rules of the State of New York”). 
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pressures to as great an extent as possible.175  Ideally, the ethics review 
board should be composed of persons who are chosen for member-
ship based on their intelligence, integrity, and independence, and 
who are then immune from retribution for the decisions they make.176  
It is preferable that these persons be “outsiders”—persons who do 
not otherwise hold city positions,177 who have no substantial ties to city 
officials,178 and who are not engaged in business transactions with the 
city.  As James Madison wrote: 
     The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to ob-
tain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most vir-
tue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, 
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst 
they continue to hold their public trust.
179
 
Once appointed to the ethics review board, members should not be 
subject to removal from office except upon a clear showing of “good 
cause.”180  To ensure that decisions are based upon a fair presentation 
of the evidence, ex parte communications with the board must be 
 
 175 See Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 143 (arguing that “[c]odes backed 
by independent boards . . . are more likely to win respect.”); Bob Warner et al., Our 
10 Ways to Reform Government: Hit Politicians Where it Matters . . . in Their War Chests, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 2, 2004, at 4, available at 2004 WLNR 19174837 (discussing 
weak enforcement of ethics rules in Philadelphia and the need for an independent 
ethics board). 
 176 Under American law, government officials and employees are generally im-
mune from liability for discretionary acts within the scope of their employment.  This 
is particularly true of government actors who perform judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions.  See generally VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 
849–52 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the immunity of federal and state officials and em-
ployees). 
 177 SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-81(d) (“No member of the Board 
shall be: (1) a salaried city official or employee; (2) an elected public official; (3) a 
candidate for elected public office; (4) an officer of a political party; . . . [or] (9) a 
lobbyist required to register under . . . this ethics code.”); Davies, Model Local Ethics 
Law, supra note 71, at 108 (proposing a model rule restricting municipal officials 
from serving on ethics board in order “to ensure that the board is as free as possible 
from pressure from other officials—co-workers and superiors alike” and stating that 
“[t]he restriction on the political make-up of the board aims to strengthen both the 
perception and the reality of a board that is nonpartisan”). 
 178 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 118 (noting “the need for municipal ethics 
boards to function independently of local government . . . .”). 
 179 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 180 E.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-81(e) (“Members of the Eth-
ics Review Board may be removed from office for cause by a majority of the City 
Council only after a public hearing at which the member was provided with the op-
portunity to be heard.  Grounds for removal include: . . . substantial neglect of duty; 
gross misconduct in office; inability to discharge the powers or duties of office; or 
violation of any provision in this code of ethics . . . .”). 
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prohibited.181  Of course, members of the ethics review board should 
be required to recuse themselves from participation in any case in 
which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.182  If an at-
torney from the city’s staff normally serves in a prosecutorial role in 
presenting complaints to the ethics review board, special independ-
ent outside counsel should be appointed to substitute as the prosecu-
tor in difficult cases, such as where a complaint is filed against the 
mayor, a city council member, or a department head.183 
The ethics review board should have jurisdiction184 over all al-
leged violations of the ethics code and the power to impose sanc-
tions.185  “Historically, ethics boards possessing only the authority to 
 
 181 Id. § 2-85(d) (“It is a violation of this code: (1) for the complainant, the re-
spondent, or any person acting on their behalf to engage or attempt to engage, di-
rectly or indirectly, in ex parte communication about the subject matter of a com-
plaint with a member of the Ethics Panel, any other member of the Ethics Review 
Board, or any known witness to the complaint; or (2) for a member of an Ethics 
Panel or any other member of the Ethics Review Board to: (A) knowingly entertain 
an ex parte communication prohibited by Subsection (1) of this rule; or (B) commu-
nicate directly or indirectly with any person, other than a member of the Ethics Re-
view Board, its staff, or the Ethics Compliance Officer, about any issue of fact or law 
relating to the complaint.”).  For similar reasons, American law prohibits ex parte 
communications with judges.  See Johnson, Ethical Foundations, supra note 40, at 1016 
(“It is difficult to overstate the importance of the rules against ex parte communica-
tion.  The rules help to ensure that a judge’s decision is based on nothing other than 
law and evidence.  Without such provisions, it would be impossible for parties to ef-
fectively address the factual assertions and legal arguments placed before judges.  
Moreover, public confidence in the judicial process would be undermined because 
the citizenry would be deprived of the information that emerges from an open and 
transparent litigation process.  Indeed, the public would not even know the identity 
of the persons who are making arguments that may prove critical in the resolution of 
pending matters.”). 
 182 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-81(g) (stating the general 
recusal rule).  In San Antonio, the ethics review board consists of eleven members.  
The mayor and ten members of the city council nominate one member each, who 
then must be confirmed by a majority vote of the city council.  Id. § 2-81(b).  A mem-
ber of the ethics review board is automatically disqualified from participating in any 
case that involves charges against the member of city council who nominated him or 
her.  Id. at § 2-81(g)(2). 
 183 Id. § 2-84(b) (discussing outside independent counsel). 
 184 An ethics review board should not be deprived of jurisdiction to review a com-
plaint relating to a city official or employee merely because the accused individual 
leaves office.  See Editorial, Giving Ethics the Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 14LI, at 
13, available at 2005 WLNR 3426518 (condemning a New York law which deprived 
the state ethics commission of jurisdiction when an employee leaves the payroll as an 
“extraordinary grant of immunity” equivalent to “racing the cops to the county 
line”). 
 185 See Putting Yonkers on the Level, supra note 47, at 13 (praising a “serious” reform 
effort to “[o]verhaul the city’s ethics code and replace its Board of Ethics with a new 
body with sharp teeth and a broad mission to investigate complaints, conduct its own 
inquiries and punish those who break the rules”). 
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issue advisory opinions have accomplished little.”186  Making ethics 
rules, but not enforcing them, breeds public cynicism187 and destroys 
confidence in government.188 
In reviewing charges of misconduct, the board must operate with 
sufficient transparency that the public is assured that complaints are 
being taken seriously and that, when necessary, appropriate sanctions 
are being imposed.  This does not mean that every aspect of the 
process must be open to public scrutiny.189  Even if the ethics code 
contains penalties for initiating frivolous charges,190 it is likely that 
some complaints will be determined as baseless.  The early dissemina-
tion of public information about such complaints may attract more 
attention in the press than will be given to the ultimate vindication of 
the accused.  To prevent unnecessary harm to the reputation of in-
nocent city officials or employees that may result from dissemination 
of information relating to charges that ultimately prove meritless,191 a 
city may wish to provide that the process’s initial stages be conducted 
in a confidential manner.192  Confidentiality might extend either to 
the point where there is an initial determination by the board that 
the complaint plausibly has merit or perhaps to the point where 
there is a determination as to whether a violation has occurred.  Of 
course, once a final determination has been made regarding a com-
 
 186 Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1341–42. 
 187 See Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 143 (noting that cynicism flows from 
“codes that are clearly unenforceable, either because the standards are stated so 
vaguely or because no enforcement mechanism . . . is in place”). 
 188 See Vincent R. Johnson, Editorial, Current City Ethics Code Lacks Enforcement, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 6, 1998, at 5 (“[C]ynicism about whether ethics rules 
are enforced destroys confidence in government.”).  Nevertheless, some authorities 
have suggested that ethics review boards should have the authority to grant waivers of 
some types of ethics rules, such as recusal requirements.  See Feerick et al., supra note 
45, at 155–56. 
 189 See THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 140 (“Democratic accountability does not re-
quire unconditional publicity in the conduct of democratic government.  Secrecy of 
various kinds is sometimes justified and even desirable in a democracy.  But it is justi-
fied only under carefully specified conditions, which ensure that the secrecy itself is 
subject to democratic accountability.”). 
 190 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-83(d) (providing sanctions 
for frivolous complaints). 
 191 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he individual’s right to 
the protection of his own good name ‘reflects no more than our basic concept of the 
essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any de-
cent system of ordered liberty.’”). 
 192 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-83(e) (“No city official or 
employee shall reveal information relating to the filing or processing of a complaint 
except as required for the performance of official duties.”). 
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plaint’s validity, news of that finding should be made available to the 
public, along with sufficient information for the public to understand 
the nature of the charges and the basis for the decision.193 
B. Imposition of Sanctions 
An ethics code will be effective only if violations are penalized by 
the imposition of appropriate sanctions.  However, if ethics regula-
tions are adopted at the city level (rather than, for example, imposed 
on the city by the state),194 the nature of the sanctions that may be lev-
ied will be a function of the limited (i.e., less than sovereign) powers 
of the city government.  There are restrictions on the power of a city 
to declare that conduct constitutes a crime or gives rise to a civil ac-
tion for damages.  In appropriate cases, however, an ethics code may 
provide that if it appears that some other criminal law has been vio-
lated, the ethics review board will refer the matter for possible prose-
cution.195 
The range of sanctions should be clearly stated in the code.  En-
forcement mechanisms196 may include: disciplinary action;197 liability 
for damages or injunctive relief;198 civil fines;199 prosecution for per-
 
 193 See id. § 2-87(a)–(b) (providing that the ethics review board shall issue an opin-
ion stating its findings and forward a copy of the opinion to the city clerk who shall 
make the opinion available to the public as authorized by law). 
 194 The New Jersey Local Government Ethics Law, for example, imposes certain 
obligations on municipal officers and employees.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-22.1–.22 
(West 1993); see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 171.004 (Vernon’s 1999) (provid-
ing that, with limitations, “[i]f a local public official has a substantial interest in a 
business entity or in real property, the official shall file, before a vote or decision on 
any matter involving the business entity or the real property, an affidavit stating the 
nature and extent of the interest and shall abstain from further participation . . . .”).  
Cf. Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1321 (discussing a New York state statute regu-
lating the “conflicts of interest for municipal officers and employees”).  States some-
times mandate that local governmental entities promulgate a code of ethics.  See id. at 
1339 (discussing the requirement under New York law).  See also Michael A. Law-
rence, The Proposed Michigan Government Ethics Act of 1999: Providing Guidance to Michi-
gan Public Officials and Employees, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 411, 451 (1999) (discuss-
ing a proposed state conflict of interest law that would offer cities an opt-out option); 
Markowitz, supra note 48, at 582 (discussing ethical standards for Vermont municipal 
officials found both in the federal and state constitutions and in Vermont statutory 
law and case law). 
 195 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(g) (discussing referral for 
prosecution). 
 196 See generally Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 98–99 (discussing 
penalties in the nature of disciplinary action, civil fine, damages, civil forfeiture, and 
misdemeanor). 
 197 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(f)(1) (discussing discipli-
nary action). 
 198 See id. § 2-87(f)(2) (discussing damages and injunctive relief). 
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jury200 or other crimes;201 voiding of a contract;202 disqualification from 
future contracting with the city;203 and forfeiture of improper finan-
cial benefits.204  The availability of non-criminal sanctions may be im-
portant, for imposition of criminal penalties may, in some cases, be 
thought too “time-consuming and often overly harsh.”205 
If the violator is a current city employee who is subject to per-
sonnel rules and procedures, the code may provide that the ethics 
violation may be punished in accordance with those provisions.206  In 
the case of other city officials and employees, disciplinary action may 
take the form of public or private notification, warning or reprimand, 
suspension of duties, or removal from office or employment by the 
appointing authority.207 
In the United States, cities do not have the power to say that a 
party who has been harmed by an ethics violation may sue for dam-
ages or injunctive relief.208  However, a city may set the stage for an 
American court, exercising its inherent common-law powers, to en-
tertain such a lawsuit.  A court may determine that a legislative en-
actment, which does not expressly discuss civil liability, and which 
provides only for criminal liability, constitutes the standard of care 
for a civil cause of action.209  In determining whether the law is well 
 
 199 See id. § 2-87(f)(5) (discussing civil fines). 
 200 See id. § 2-87(g) (discussing perjury). 
 201 See id. (discussing criminal prosecution). 
 202 See id. § 2-87(f)(4) (discussing voiding of a contract). 
 203 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(f)(3) (disqualification 
from contracting). 
 204 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 120 (proposing civil forfeiture up to three 
times the value of any financial benefit received as a result of unethical conduct). 
 205 Feerick, Historical Overview, supra note 41, at 5 (discussing ethics in government 
at the federal level). 
 206 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(f)–(g) (discussing discipli-
nary action). 
 207 See id. § 2-87(f)(1) (discussing types of disciplinary sanctions). 
 208 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 176, at 846 (“While municipalities (like other 
political subdivisions of states) exercise some government functions, they are not 
“sovereigns”—they cannot, for example, adopt rules of tort liability . . . .”) (citing 
Mich. Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndale, 662 N.W.2d 864, 
872 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a city could not enact and enforce ordi-
nances that made local public buildings gun-free zones); Davies, Model Local Ethics 
Law, supra note 71, at 100 (“A municipality may not by local law create a new cause of 
action.”). 
 209 See Hoosier v. Lander, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 521 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
violation of gun-control laws supported a civil cause of action against a gun dealer); 
see also Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976) (“In a growing number 
of states, the rule concerning the proper role of a penal statute in a civil action for 
damages is that violation of the statute which has been found to apply to a particular 
set of facts establishes . . . a prima facie case of negligence . . . .”). 
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suited to that purpose, the court typically asks whether the statute was 
intended to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff was a 
member from the type of harm that occurred.210  If the court answers 
both of those questions in the affirmative and finds no other obsta-
cles,211 such as legislative obsolescence or vagueness,212 the court may 
elect to embrace the standard as a basis for civil liability.  If an ethics 
code expressly states that it was intended to protect the city and 
members of the public from economic losses caused by non-
compliance,213 there is a clear invitation for a court to recognize a 
cause of action for damages. 
A city may have the power to impose civil fines only in a low 
monetary amount.  However, in some contexts, it may be possible for 
a city to circumvent that type of limitation.  In the case of a violation 
of reporting provisions, a code may specify that each day of non-
 
 210 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a stat-
ute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, 
and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to pro-
tect.”). 
 211 A court should not adopt a statute as setting the standard of care for a civil 
cause of action if the legislature intended that the specified penalty be the exclusive 
sanction for an infraction, or if there is other evidence that the legislature intended 
to bar use of the statutory standard in tort cases.  Cf. Hoosier, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521 
(rejecting an argument that state and federal gun-control laws are intended only to 
impose criminal penalties). 
 212 A court may refuse to embrace a vague statute as setting the standard of care.  
See Hosein v. Checker Taxi Co., Inc., 419 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (involving a 
statute requiring bulletproof shields in taxicabs which had been declared unconstitu-
tionally vague in a prior criminal action); Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. 
1998) (holding that a child abuse reporting statute, which imposed a reporting re-
quirement on any person having “cause to believe” that a child was being abused, was 
not an appropriate standard, in part because the statutory standard was not clearly 
defined); La.-Pac. Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1998) (involving an “as-
sured clear distance” statute that required the driver of a vehicle following another 
vehicle to exercise “due regard” for the relative speed of the vehicles). 
 213 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(f)(2).  Section  
2-87(f)(2) states that: 
This code of ethics has been enacted . . . to protect the City and any 
other person from any losses or increased costs incurred by the City or 
other person as a result of the violation of these provisions.  It is the in-
tent of the City that this ethics code can and should be recognized by a 
court as a proper basis for a civil cause of action for damages or injunc-
tive relief based upon a violation of its provisions, and that such forms 
of redress should be available in addition to any other penalty or rem-
edy contained in this code of ethics . . . or any other law. 
For example, if a party who is awarded a city contract violated the ethics rules during 
the bidding process, such that the contract is then voided, the city and other bidders 
should be able to recover the costs they incur incidental to a second bidding process. 
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compliance after a filing deadline has passed constitutes a new viola-
tion.214  The aggregate penalty may add up to a substantial sum. 
The predicate for a perjury prosecution may be established by 
requiring that certain written statements be sworn under oath.  This 
obligation may be imposed by rules stating financial disclosure re-
quirements for city officials and employees,215 or persons doing busi-
ness with the city, or by the rules governing complaints216 or re-
sponses217 filed with the ethics review board. 
In cases in which ethics rules are violated by persons doing busi-
ness with the city, penalties might include loss of a contract that has 
already been awarded218 or being banned from doing business with 
the city in the future.219  These sanctions may constitute a serious de-
terrent to unethical conduct.  It is important to consider carefully the 
remedial options relating to an ethics review board finding that there 
has been a violation of the rules relating to the awarding of a con-
tract.  An ethics code could provide that the contract is automatically 
void.  However, voiding the contract may not always be in the best 
economic interests of the city.  Moreover, if the contract turned out 
to be disadvantageous to the violator, voiding it would allow the viola-
tor to profit from its own wrongdoing.220  The rules might alterna-
tively say that in such cases the city may elect to void the contract.  
However, there is some risk that such weak language might invite a 
city with poor leadership to ignore the ethics violation—to sweep the 
breach “under the rug.”  The better course is probably for the code 
to state that if the ethics review board finds that there has been a vio-
 
 214 See id. § 2-87(f)(5) (discussing civil fines). 
 215 See id. § 2-73(a)(1) (requiring that financial disclosure reports filed by city offi-
cials and employees be sworn). 
 216 See id. § 2-83(a) (requiring that a complaint must be sworn). 
 217 See id. § 2-83(f)(1) (requiring that a response to a complaint must be sworn). 
 218 See, e.g., id. § 2-87(f)(4) (discussing voiding or ratification of a contract pro-
cured incidental to a violation of the ethics code). 
 219 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-87(f)(3)(c) (discussing 
disqualification from contracting and expressly providing that, notwithstanding the 
sanction, nothing in the section “shall be construed to prohibit any person from re-
ceiving a service or benefit, or from using a facility, which is generally available to the 
public, according to the same terms”). 
 220 The principle that a person should not profit from his or her own wrongdoing 
runs throughout the law.  See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“The paramount purpose of enforcing the prohibition against insider trading by 
ordering disgorgement is to make sure that wrongdoers will not profit from their 
wrongdoing.”). 
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lation of provisions relating to the awarding of a contract, the city 
must vote on whether to ratify or void the contract.221 
VI. ETHICS EDUCATION 
A. Training 
It is just as important to educate city officials and employees 
about their ethical responsibilities as it is to detect and punish viola-
tions of those norms.  An ethics code should therefore be clearly writ-
ten because “[o]fficials cannot obey an ethics law they do not under-
stand.”222  Once a code is adopted, it should be posted and circulated 
widely, and should be available prominently on the city’s website, 
along with other related information,223 including guidance on how 
persons can file a complaint.  In some circumstances, it may be ap-
propriate for the city to appoint an ethics ombudsman to assist mem-
bers of the public in navigating the ethics enforcement process.224  
Obviously, a city must invest adequate resources in publicizing the 
requirements of an ethics code and training personnel to recognize, 
and deal with appropriately, issues relating to standards of conduct. 
 
 221 See generally City of San Diego v. Furgatch, Nos. D038587, D038751, D038879, 
2002 WL 1575109, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. July 17, 2002) (holding that a city could rat-
ify tainted contracts relating to a redevelopment project and major league baseball 
park because a city council member’s resignation removed the disability relating to 
conflict of interest which might have made the contracts invalid). 
 222 Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 178–79 (“[W]henever possible, ethics codes 
should contain bright-line rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook—that 
is, on the one hand this, on . . . the other hand that, and on the third hand something else.  
Yet, one New York State ethics provision contains fifteen exceptions, with exceptions 
to the exceptions.  No ethics provision should require fifteen exceptions.”). 
 223 The city of San Antonio’s current website has an easy to locate ethics section 
which contains, among other things, the city code of ethics, information on filing a 
complaint, ethics forms, the ethics review board annual report, information about 
requesting an advisory opinion, opinions previously issued, campaign finance rules 
and reports, and various training materials and manuals.  The campaign finance in-
formation is particularly impressive.  Simply type in the name of the contributor or 
candidate and information about campaign contributions is immediately available.  
City of San Antonio, Campaign Finance Electronic Filing System Search Page, 
https://epay.sanantonio.gov/campfin/search.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).  See 
also City of San Antonio, Links to Ethics, Campaign Finance, and Lobbyist Informa-
tion for the City of San Antonio, http://www.sanantonio.gov/ecfl/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2006). 
 224 See Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 145 (“Most ombudsmen perform the 
role of impartial investigator of complaints filed by those who are traditionally un-
derrepresented. . . . [T]his office not only acts as a bureaucratic watchdog, but . . . 
tries to . . . make bureaucracy more approachable.”). 
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An ethics code is typically a complex legal document.225  In many 
cases, the code must be “translated” into more reader-friendly lan-
guage for training and everyday use.226  This type of user manual 
should be made widely available to city officials and employees,227 
along with the caution that the manual is merely a guide to the ethics 
code, not a substitute for its provisions.  All city officials and employ-
ees should be required to participate in an annual ethics training ses-
sion, and such training should be part of the orientation of every new 
official or employee.228  In addition, city leadership, through public 
statements and example, must reinforce the idea that ethics in gov-
ernment is a top priority.229 
B. Ethics Opinions 
It is important that city officials and employees who have ethics 
questions obtain prompt230 and reliable answers.  A city should have a 
designated ethics officer whose job is to respond to such requests.231  
 
 225 Cf. Davies, Conflicts, supra note 48, at 1323 (discussing a New York statute regu-
lating conflicts of interest of municipal officials and employees that was “sufficiently 
complicated to puzzle experienced municipal attorneys” and “to a lay person . . . vir-
tually unintelligible”). 
 226 Some recommend a different approach.  They propose that an ethics code 
read as a short clear document, essentially like the Ten Commandments.  See Davies, 
Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 85 (urging that “the first section of an ethics 
law should be a code of ethics” and that “substantive provisions should not be buried 
in intricately drafted definitions”).  Yet if a code is to be enforced as a legal docu-
ment and serve as the basis for legal sanctions, it must contain precise guidance as to 
how far an official or employee’s duties extend.  It is better to create a code that is a 
detailed document accompanied by a training manual that is simplified, rather than 
to simplify the code and lose necessary details in commentary or by reason of dele-
tion. 
 227 A good example is the City of Phoenix Ethics Handbook, supra note 113.  See also 
U.S. OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS, A BRIEF WRAP ON ETHICS (2000), available at 
http://www.usoge.gov/pages/forms_pubs_otherdocs/fpo_files/booklets/bkbriefwra
p_00.txt (an ethics pamphlet for executive branch employees).  Cf. Davies, Myths, su-
pra note 11, at 177 (“Governmental ethicists must . . . demythologize . . . [ethics 
laws].  They must separate the wheat of first principles from the chaff of political re-
alities, public pressure, and bureaucratic inertia.”). 
 228 See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Ten Effective Strategies for Counseling Municipal Cli-
ents on Ethics Issues, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 41, at 296 
(discussing ethics training). 
 229 See Huddleston & Sands, supra note 44, at 143 (arguing that government ethics 
codes “clearly embraced by top agency management and embedded in an ethical or-
ganizational culture are more likely to win respect”). 
 230 See Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 180 (“Public servants do not want analysis 
but answers; and, whenever possible, they want those answers not next month or next 
year but immediately, or at least within a few days.”). 
 231 Cf. Sewell Chan, M.T.A. Adopts Ethics Code Curbing Gifts to Employees, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 2005, at B4, available at 2005 WLNR 8310982 (discussing adoption of a 
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Many inquiries will be informal and will simply call for oral “off the 
cuff” answers.  Other inquiries will be of a more serious nature and 
necessitate a higher level of assurance as to the appropriate course.  
The city ethics code should contain procedures clearly detailing the 
process for requesting a written ethics opinion.232  A person who rea-
sonably and in good faith acts in accordance with an advisory opinion 
issued by the city at his or her request should be immune from being 
found to have violated his or her ethical obligations.  Of course, this 
should be true only if the person fairly and accurately disclosed all 
relevant facts when requesting the opinion.233  In addition, it may be 
appropriate for an opinion to state that a party may not rely on its 
continuing validity if more than a certain period of time (perhaps two 
years or five years) has elapsed since its issuance.234 
If advisory opinions about ethical obligations are issued by a city 
officer or employee (as opposed to an independent ethics review 
board),235 and if reliance on an opinion can grant effective immunity 
from prosecution, there is a risk that the issuer of the opinion may be 
pressured to approve a questionable course of conduct.  There may 
be considerable pressure to write an opinion favorable to the party 
making the request, if, for example the issuer is an employee termi-
nable at will and the party seeking the opinion is a high-level official 
or employee with power to influence whether the issuer continues to 
be employed.  To minimize the risk of abuse, the ethics opinion issu-
ance process should be fully transparent.  When the opinion is issued, 
it should be available to the public, preferably on the city website, not 
only because other persons may find its guidance useful, but because 
third persons should be able to scrutinize the legitimacy of the opin-
ion and the process through which it was issued. 
VII. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 
Building an effective legal regime for regulating ethics in city 
government is a task that is neither simple nor inexpensive.  Indeed, 
 
transportation authority code which “identifies an ethics officer for each of the au-
thority’s subsidiaries and provides a toll-free ethics hotline . . . .”). 
 232 See Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 117–19 (discussing advisory 
opinions). 
 233 See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-89(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating limi-
tation). 
 234 See id. § 2-89(b)(2)(A)(iii) (imposing five-year limitation). 
 235 See id. §§ 2-84(a)(2), 2-89(b) (providing for some opinions to be issued by the 
Office of the City Attorney, although others are issued by the independent ethics re-
view board). 
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not only is the task difficult,236 and one requiring continual atten-
tion,237 it is an endeavor which cannot even ensure good govern-
ment.238  If the persons who hold public positions are unwilling to as-
pire to high standards and act in furtherance of the common good, 
no ethics code can fully substitute for that lack of moral ambition.239 
Yet the enactment and enforcement of a good ethics code can 
be an important step in treating individuals fairly by ensuring an 
equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits that government provides.240  
An ethics code can also be good for business because a city that con-
ducts its affairs in accordance with high standards is more likely to en-
joy the confidence of investors241 and to derive economic benefits at-
tributable to that confidence.  At a more basic level, a city that places 
a priority on ethics is a healthier institution than one that does not.242  
A healthy democratic body is more capable of withstanding the winds 
of change and better able to respond to new demands.  Indeed, “a 
democratic system of government cannot function properly if the 
 
 236 See Feerick, Historical Overview, supra note 41, at 10 (noting “considerable resis-
tance to the idea of ethics reform”). 
 237 Id. at 10 (“It is of paramount importance that governmental ethics be con-
stantly evaluated and reexamined . . . . ”). 
 238 See Cox, supra note 28, at 300 (“[W]e cannot establish high ethical standards by 
legislation alone.  The personal code by which each . . . public official judges himself 
or herself . . . will do more to govern individual performance than all the statutes and 
executive orders on the books.”). 
 239 Cf. Marx, supra note 38, at 440 (stating that “in public ethics no less than in 
private ethics it is the individual’s responsible moral judgment that must serve as the 
compass of decision”). 
 240 See MARSHALL EDWARD DIMOCK & GLADYS OGDEN DIMOCK, PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 127 (4th ed. 1969) (opining that a professional code of ethics is one 
means of “securing openness and fair treatment”); Cox, supra note 28, at 300 (“We 
need . . . professional codes, statutes, and executive orders, both to express our 
moral sense and to sharpen awareness of its applications.”); Vincent R. Johnson, Edi-
torial, Ethics Code Part of Good Government, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 2, 1998, at 
5B (explaining how provisions in a proposed city ethics code, which would prohibit 
the exercise of official power on the basis of personal connections,  would tend “to 
ensure that ‘equal justice under law’ is the rule, not the exception”).  See also Zin-
man, supra note 89, at 142 (arguing that while “[g]ood ethics rules do not ensure 
good government, . . . they are a crucial prerequisite”). 
 241 Cf. Mary Ann Feldheim and Xiaohu Wang, Ethics and Public Trust: Results from a 
National Survey, 6 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 63, 63 (Winter 2003–04) (“[T]here are higher 
perceptions of trust in cities where there are high perceptions of ethical behaviors.”). 
 242 See Feerick et al., supra note 45, at 129 (“In a democracy, distrust can be as 
damaging as corruption itself.”); Martin Painter, Contracting, the Enterprise Culture and 
Public Sector Ethics in ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, 
at 165, 166 (arguing that “[t]he barometer of public sector ethics is the health and 
robustness of the public institutions within which officials hold their offices.  When 
such institutions are routinely corrupted . . . moral agents within them are frequently 
rendered powerless . . . .”). 
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public believes its officials are corrupt.”243  Finally, the adoption and 
enforcement of a sound ethics code “increase[s] the influence of the 
large majority of people to whom a high standard of official conduct 
is a self-evident necessity.”244  For all of these reasons—fairness to in-
dividuals, encouragement of business, institutional strength, and em-
powerment of the citizenry—it is appropriate for a city to spend valu-
able resources on adopting and periodically revising an ethics code, 
teaching officials and employees about their responsibilities, and en-
forcing high standards for the conduct of public affairs. 
APPENDIX: SELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT ETHICS CODE PROVISIONS245 
Part A.  Current City Officials and Employees 
 Rule A-1.  Improper Economic Benefit246 
 (a) General Rule.  A city official or employee shall not take any 
official action that he or she knows is likely to affect the economic 
interests247 of: 
 
 243 Davies, Myths, supra note 11, at 178. 
 244 See Marx, supra note 38, at 441 (quoting the report of a government ethics 
commission). 
 245 Provisions similar or identical to the ones found in this Appendix appear in 
the Ethics Code of the City of San Antonio.  In turn, some of the provisions in the San An-
tonio Ethics Code were based on language found in the ethics codes of other American 
cities (e.g., Austin, Tex.; Dallas, Tex.; Houston, Tex.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Milwaukee, 
Wis.; Phoenix, Ariz.; San Jose, Cal.; Seattle, Wash.), on provisions found in the 
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and on other sources, in-
cluding Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 69–71.  While the language 
here tracks the San Antonio Ethics Code, the Author of this Article has deleted or al-
tered language which, in his opinion, is unnecessarily complex for model purposes 
or which reflected weakness in the San Antonio Ethics Code that developed during the 
political process of winning adoption of the code. 
 246 This provision is based on SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43; see 
also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 12A, § 12A-3 (2006), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/tx/dallas.shtml [hereinafter DALLAS ETHICS CODE]. 
 247 The term “economic interest” should be defined in the city ethics code.  A pos-
sible definition is: 
     “Economic interest” includes, but is not limited to, legal or equita-
ble property interests in land, chattels, and intangibles, and contractual 
rights having more than de minimis value.  Service by a city official or 
employee as an officer, director, advisor, or otherwise active participant 
in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization 
does not create for that city official or employee an economic interest 
in the property of the organization. 
     Ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund 
that holds securities or other assets is not an economic interest in such 
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(1) the official or employee; 
(2) his or her parent, child, spouse, or other family mem-
ber248 within the second degree of consanguinity249 or affin-
ity;250 
(3) his or her outside client; 
(4) a member of his or her household; 
(5) the outside employer of the official or employee or of 
his or her parent, child, or spouse;251 
(6) a business entity in which the official or employee 
knows that any of the persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or 
(a)(2) holds an economic interest; 
(7) a business entity which the official or employee knows 
is an affiliated252 business or partner253 of a business entity in 
 
securities or other assets unless the person in question participates in 
the management of the fund. 
SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(n). 
 248 It might be desirable to expand this section to impose the same obligations 
with respect to unmarried domestic partners.  Subsection (4), which deals with 
household members, will cover some domestic partners.  However, depending on 
how the term is defined, the designation “domestic partner” might encompass a per-
son maintaining a separate residence. 
 249 “Consanguinity” means relationship by blood.  An individual’s relatives within 
the second degree by consanguinity are the individual’s: (1) parent or child (rela-
tives in the first degree); and (2) brother, sister, grandparent, or grandchild (rela-
tives in the second degree).  See TEXAS GOV’T CODE ANN. § 573.023 (Vernon 2004). 
 250 “Affinity” means relationship by marriage. 
A husband and wife are related to each other in the first degree by af-
finity.  For other relationships by affinity, the degree of relationship is 
the same as the degree of the underlying relationship by consanguinity.  
For example: if two individuals are related to each other in the second 
degree by consanguinity, the spouse of one of the individuals is related 
to the other individual in the second degree by affinity. 
Id. § 573.025(a).  Thus, the term second degree of affinity includes: a spouse’s grand-
father, grandmother, grandson, or granddaughter; a spouse’s brother or sister; and a 
brother or sister’s spouse. 
 251 As the years pass, ethics codes sometimes become riddled with exceptions 
which, to serve some private purpose, are enacted into law when there is little or no 
public attention.  When the San Antonio Ethics Code was passed in November 1998, it 
contained a rule prohibiting official action that was likely to affect substantially the 
economic interests of “the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or 
her parent, child, or spouse . . . .”  At some later date, language was inserted into the 
code so that the provision now speaks of “the outside employer of the official or em-
ployee or of his or her parent, child (unless the child is a minor), spouse . . . .”  SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-43(a)(5) (emphasis added).  Obviously, it 
makes no sense to be able to affect the economic interests of a child’s employer just 
because the child is a minor.  One of the reasons that ethics codes must be periodi-
cally reviewed and revised is to detect and purge such ill-advised amendments. 
 252 The term “affiliated” may be defined by stating that: “Business entities are ‘af-
filiated’ if one is the parent or subsidiary of the other or if they are subsidiaries of the 
same parent business entity.”  SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(b). 
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which any of the persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or 
(a)(2) holds an economic interest; 
(8) a business entity or nonprofit entity for which the city 
official or employee serves as an officer or director or in any 
other policy making position; or 
(9) a person or business entity: 
(A) from whom, within the past twelve months, the 
official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or 
indirectly has (i) solicited, (ii) received and not re-
jected, or (iii) accepted an offer of employment; or 
(B) with whom the official or employee, or his or 
her spouse, directly or indirectly is engaged, or within 
the past twelve months engaged, in negotiations per-
taining to business opportunities. 
 (b) Recusal and Disclosure.  A city official or employee whose 
conduct would otherwise violate Subsection (a) must recuse him-
self or herself.  From the time that the conflict is, or should have 
been recognized, he or she shall: 
(1) immediately refrain from further participation in the 
matter, including discussions with any persons likely to con-
sider the matter; and 
(2) promptly file with the City Clerk the appropriate form 
for disclosing the nature and extent of the prohibited con-
duct. 
In addition: 
(3) a supervised employee shall promptly bring the con-
flict to the attention of his or her supervisor, who will then, 
if necessary, reassign responsibility for handling the matter 
to another person; and 
(4) a member of a board shall promptly disclose the con-
flict to other members of the board and shall not be present 
during the board’s discussion of, or voting on, the matter. 
 (c) Definitions.  For purposes of this rule: 
(1) An action is likely to affect an economic interest if it is 
likely to have an effect on that interest that is distinguishable 
from its effect on members of the public in general or a sub-
stantial segment thereof;254 and 
 
 253 The term “partner” may be defined as follows: “A ‘partner’ is someone who 
engages in an activity or undertaking with another, including a venture that has 
shared benefits and risks.  The term ‘partner’ includes, but is not limited to, partners 
in general partnerships, limited partnerships, and joint ventures.”  See SAN ANTONIO 
ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(y) (similar provision). 
 254 This provision means, for example, that an elected official is not prohibited 
from voting on a proposal that would raise or lower taxes for everyone in the com-
JOHNSON FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  2:40:32 PM 
770 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:715 
(2) The term client includes business relationships of a 
highly personalized nature, but not ordinary business-
customer relationships.255 
 Rule A-2.  Unfair Advancement of Private Interests256 
 (a) General Rule.  A city official or employee may not use his or 
her official position to unfairly advance or impede private inter-
ests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any 
person (including himself or herself) any form of special consid-
eration, treatment, exemption, or advantage beyond that which is 
lawfully available to other persons.  A city official who represents 
to a person that he or she may provide an advantage to that per-
son based on the official’s position on a board or commission vio-
lates this rule. 
 (b) Special Rules.  The following special rules apply in addition 
to the general rule: 
(1) Acquisition of Interest in Impending Matters.  A city 
official or employee shall not acquire an interest in, or af-
fected by, any contract, transaction, zoning decision, or 
other matter, if the official or employee knows, or has rea-
son to know, that the interest will be directly or indirectly af-
fected by impending official action by the city. 
(2) Reciprocal Favors.  A city official or employee may 
not enter into an agreement or understanding with any 
other person that official action by the official or employee 
will be rewarded or reciprocated by the other person, di-
rectly or indirectly. 
(3) Appointment of Relatives.  A city official or employee 
shall not appoint or employ, or vote to appoint or employ, 
any relative within the second degree of consanguinity257 or 
 
munity.  However, if only a small number of persons in the city, including the city 
official, own restaurants, the city official would be disqualified from voting on a pro-
posal to raise or lower taxes on restaurants. 
 255 Under this provision, a city official who owns a coffee shop would not have to 
abstain from participation in a matter relating to one of the many hundreds of cus-
tomers who occasionally buy a cup of coffee at the shop because the relationship is 
not “highly personalized.”  However, a city official who is a lawyer engaged in the 
practice of law would have to abstain from participating in a matter relating to a cli-
ent represented by the lawyer in a pending lawsuit because the lawyer-client relation-
ship is highly personalized. 
 256 This provision is based on § 2-44 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-4 (containing similar and re-
lated provisions). 
 257 See supra note 249. 
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affinity258 to any office or position of employment within the 
city. 
(4) Supervision of Relatives.  No official or employee 
shall be permitted to be in the line of supervision of a rela-
tive within the second degree of consanguinity259 or affin-
ity.260  Department heads are responsible for enforcing this 
policy.  If an employee, by reason of marriage, promotion, 
reorganization, or otherwise, is placed into the line of super-
vision of a relative, one of the employees will be reassigned 
or other appropriate arrangements will be made for supervi-
sion. 
 (c) Recusal and Disclosure.  A city official or employee whose 
conduct would otherwise violate Subsection (b)(3) of this Rule 
shall adhere to the recusal and disclosure provisions provided in 
Rule A-1 (Improper Economic Benefit). 
 Rule A-3.  Gifts261 
 (a) General Rule.  A city official or employee shall not solicit, 
accept, or agree to accept any gift or benefit for himself or herself 
or his or her business: (1) that reasonably tends to influence or 
reward official conduct; or (2) that the official or employee knows 
or should know is being offered with the intent to influence or 
reward official conduct.262 
 
 258 See supra note 250. 
 259 See supra note 249. 
 260 See supra note 250. 
 261 This provision is loosely based on § 2-45 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, su-
pra note 16, with significant variations.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, 
§ 12A-5 (containing a similar general rule and some similar exceptions).  The San 
Antonio rule, unlike the Dallas rule, contains a “wining and dining” exception which 
allows persons doing business with the city and lobbyists to pay for the meals of pub-
lic officials “in an individual expense of $50 or less at any occurrence, and no more 
than a cumulative value of $500 in a single calendar year from a single source.”  SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-45(a)(2)(C)(ii).  From the viewpoint of 
government ethics, this is not a wise exception.  However, the exception may illus-
trate how failure to pay employees a decent salary—in any profession—leads to ques-
tionable practices.  In San Antonio, city council members receive no salary for per-
forming what is more than a full-time job and are compensated $20 for attending 
each council meeting.  See Vincent R. Johnson, Editorial, A Well-Run City Worth the 
Cost, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 9, 2004, at 5H (supporting a proposed city 
charter amendment providing a salary for members of city council; the amendment 
later failed to pass). 
 262 It may be possible to mount a constitutional attack against this type of lan-
guage.  In People v. Moore, 377 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (Fulton County Ct. 1975), the 
court considered a state statute which prohibited a municipal officer or employee 
from accepting a gift having a value of more than $25 “under circumstances in which 
it could reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence him, or could 
reasonably be expected to influence him, in the performance of his official duties or 
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 (b) Special Applications.  Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) do not 
include: 
(1) a gift to a city official or employee relating to a special 
occasion, such as a wedding, anniversary, graduation, birth, 
illness, death, or holiday, provided that the value of the gift 
is fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relation-
ship between the donor and recipient; 
(2) reimbursement of reasonable expenses for travel au-
thorized in accordance with city policies; 
(3) a public award or reward for meritorious service or 
professional achievement, provided that the award or reward 
is reasonable in light of the occasion; 
(4) ordinary social hospitality; 
(5) a loan from a lending institution made in its regular 
course of business on the same terms generally available to 
the public; 
(6) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same 
terms and based on the same criteria that are applied to 
other applicants; 
(7) admission to an event in which the city official or em-
ployee is participating in connection with official duties or in 
connection with his or her spouse’s duties; 
(8) any benefit solicited by the city official or employee 
on behalf of a civic or charitable organization, which is 
promptly delivered to the organization; 
(9) ceremonial and protocol gifts presented by a govern-
ment or organization, accepted on behalf of the city for the 
use of the city, and properly reported to the city; or 
(10) admission to a charity event provided by the sponsor 
of the event, if the offer is unsolicited by the city official or 
employee. 
 (c) Campaign Contribution Exception.  The general prohibition 
on gifts stated in Subsection (a) does not apply to a lawful cam-
paign contribution. 
 
was intended as a reward for any official action on his part.”  Id. at 1007.  The court 
found that the language was “vague and without any standard or guidelines whatso-
ever” and accordingly unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  Id. at 1008.  However, another 
(higher) New York court upheld disciplinary action imposed for a violation of a rule 
in a town ethics code that contained similar language without addressing the consti-
tutional question.  See Merrin v. Town Board of Kirkwood, 369 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 
(App. Div. 1975) (involving the demotion of an employee who accepted a stereo 
from a chemical supplier and in return used that supplier’s chemicals). 
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 (d) Gifts to Closely Related Persons. 
(1) A city official or employee shall take reasonable steps 
to persuade (A) a parent, spouse, child, or other relative 
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity or (B) 
an outside business associate not to solicit, accept, or agree 
to accept any gift or benefit that reasonably tends to influ-
ence or reward the city official’s or employee’s official con-
duct, or that the official or employee knows or should know 
is being offered with the intent to influence or reward the 
city official’s or employee’s discharge of official duties. 
(2) If a city official or employee required to file an annual 
financial disclosure report knows that a gift or benefit trig-
gering the reasonable-steps obligations under Subsection 
(d)(1) has been accepted and retained by a person identi-
fied in that subsection, the official or employee shall 
promptly file a report with the City Clerk’s office disclosing 
the donor, the value of the gift or benefit, the recipient, and 
the recipient’s relationship to the official or employee filing 
the report.263 
 (e) Definitions. 
(1) For purposes of this rule, a person is an “outside busi-
ness associate” if both that person and the city official or 
employee own, with respect to the same business entity: (A) 
ten (10) percent or more of the voting stock or shares of the 
business entity, or (B) ten (10) percent or more of the fair 
market value of the business entity. 
(2) For purposes of this rule, a “sponsor” of an event is 
the person or persons primarily responsible for organizing 
the event.  A person who simply contributes money or buys 
tickets to an event is not considered a sponsor. 
 Rule A-4.  Representation of Private Interests264 
 (a) Representation by a Member of a Board.  A city official or 
employee who is a member of a board or other city body shall not 
represent any person, group, or entity: (1) before that board or 
body; (2) before city staff having responsibility for making rec-
ommendations to, or taking any action on behalf of, that board or 
body; or (3) before a board or other city body which has appellate 
 
 263 Telling the relative that there is a duty under Subsection (d)(2) to disclose the 
gift may persuade the relative not to accept the gift in the first place.  In addition, the 
existence of the disclosure obligation may dissuade would-be gift givers from offering 
improper gifts. 
 264 This provision is based on § 2-47 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-5 (similar provision). 
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jurisdiction over the board or body of which the city official or 
employee is a member. 
 (b) Representation Before the City. 
(1) General Rule.  A city official or employee shall not 
represent any person, group, or entity, other than himself or 
herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, before the 
city. 
(2) Exception for Board Members.  The rule stated in 
Subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a person who is classi-
fied as a city official only because he or she is an appointed 
member of a board or other city body. 
(3) Prestige of Office and Improper Influence.  In con-
nection with the representation of private interests before 
the city, a city official or employee shall not: (A) assert the 
prestige of the official’s or employee’s city position for the 
purpose of advancing private interests; or (B) state or imply 
that he or she is able to influence city action on any basis 
other than the merits. 
 (c) Representation in Litigation Adverse to the City. 
(1) Officials and Employees Other than Board Members.  
A city official or employee, other than a person who is classi-
fied as an official only because he or she is an appointed 
member of a board or other city body, shall not represent 
any person, group, or entity, other than himself or herself, 
or his or her spouse or minor children, in any litigation to 
which the city is a party, if the interests of that person, 
group, or entity are adverse to the interests of the city. 
(2) Board Members.  A person who is classified as a city 
official only because he or she is an appointed member of a 
board or other city body shall not represent any person, 
group, or entity, other than himself or herself, or his or her 
spouse or minor children, in any litigation to which the city 
is a party, if the interests of that person, group, or entity are 
adverse to interests of the city and the matter is substantially 
related to the official’s duties to the city. 
 (d) Definition.  “Representation” encompasses all forms of com-
munication and personal appearances in which a person, not act-
ing in performance of official duties, formally serves as an advo-
cate for private interests, regardless of whether the representation 
is compensated.  Lobbying may be a form of representation.  Rep-
resentation does not include appearance as a fact witness or ex-
pert witness in litigation or other official proceedings. 
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 Rule A-5.  Conflicting Outside Employment265 
 (a) Impairment of Judgment or Performance.  A city official or 
employee shall not solicit, accept, or engage in concurrent out-
side employment which could reasonably be expected to impair 
independence of judgment in, or faithful performance of, official 
duties. 
 (b) Relationship to Official Duties.  A city official or employee 
shall not provide services to an outside employer related to the of-
ficial’s or employee’s city duties. 
 Rule A-6.  Confidential Information266 
 (a) Improper Access.  A city official or employee shall not use 
his or her position to obtain official information about any person 
or entity for any purpose other than the performance of official 
duties. 
 (b) Improper Disclosure or Use.  A city official or employee 
shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly disclose any confi-
dential information gained by reason of the official or employee’s 
position concerning the property, operations, policies or affairs of 
the city.  This rule does not prohibit: (1) any disclosure of infor-
mation that is no longer confidential by law; or (2) the confiden-
tial reporting of illegal or unethical conduct to authorities desig-
nated by law. 
 Rule A-7.  Public Property and Resources267 
 A city official or employee shall not use, request, or permit the 
use of city facilities, personnel, equipment, or supplies for private 
purposes (including political purposes), except: (a) pursuant to 
duly adopted city policies, or (b) to the extent and according to 
the terms that those resources are lawfully available to the public. 
 
 265 This provision is based on § 2-46 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-6 (similar provision). 
 266 This provision is based on § 2-46 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-6 (similar provision). 
 267 This provision is based on § 2-49 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-9 (similar provision). 
JOHNSON FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  2:40:32 PM 
776 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:715 
 Rule A-8.  Political Activity268 
 (a) Influencing Subordinates.  A city official or employee shall 
not, directly or indirectly, induce or attempt to induce any city 
subordinate of the official or employee: (1) to participate in an 
election campaign, contribute to a candidate or political commit-
tee, or engage in any other political activity relating to a particular 
party, candidate, or issue; or (2) to refrain from engaging in any 
lawful political activity.269  A general statement merely encourag-
ing another person to vote does not violate this rule. 
 (b) Paid Campaigning.  A city official or employee shall not ac-
cept anything of value, directly or indirectly, for political activity 
relating to an item pending on the ballot, if he or she participated 
in, or provided advice relating to, the exercise of discretionary au-
 
 268 This provision is based on § 2-50 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  In a rule on political activity, it may be appropriate to consider whether an ex-
ception should be created to permit solicitation of city employees who are political 
appointees.  See Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 75. 
Some cities seek to prevent public officials from using the prestige of public of-
fice to assist other candidates for election.  See, e.g., DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 
246, § 12A-10 (“In any election, except his or her own, a city official shall not: (1) use 
the prestige of the city official’s position with the city on behalf of a candidate, politi-
cal party, or political committee, except that: (A) a city official is not prohibited from 
lending his or her name so long as the office held with the city is not mentioned in 
connection with the endorsement; and; (B) a city council member is not prohibited 
from lending his or her name and official city title in connection with any election 
for public office or in connection with any election ordered by the city of Dallas on a 
proposition or measure . . . .”).  The efficacy and wisdom of such provisions may be 
questioned.  The provisions appear to be ill-advised attempts to transplant language 
from a code of judicial ethics, which prohibits using the prestige of judicial office for 
the advancement of private interests, into a government ethics code.  See MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2004).  Generally speaking, while we do not 
want judges to act politically, we expect a wide range of public officials to do so, in-
cluding mayors and members of city councils.  While the Dallas rule does not pro-
hibit private-citizen-style endorsements, it may, in reality, be impossible for an 
elected city official to make an endorsement as a private citizen without implicitly as-
serting the prestige of public office, even if the office is not mentioned.  In addition, 
the use of the prestige of public office for the advancement of another candidate for 
public office is not always undesirable, as when a city official speaks out against a 
candidate who advocates policies that would hurt the city.  It makes no sense to force 
the mayor to pretend that he is not the mayor when he endorses or opposes another 
candidate. 
 269 Issues may arise as to whether a political mass mailing that unintentionally 
reaches a subordinate violates the rule.  Presumably the word “induce,” as used in 
the rule, denotes conduct of a more intentional nature.  Thus, while an inadvertent 
contact by means of mass mailing would not violate the rule, a targeted mailing 
would run afoul of the provision.  Some codes address this problem by banning only 
“knowing” political solicitation.  See Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 71, at 
75 (“Inclusion of the word ‘knowingly’ means that neither an official nor his or her 
campaign committee need cull the names of municipal officials from voter registra-
tion lists.”). 
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thority by a city body that contributed to the development of the 
ballot item.  For purposes of this rule, “anything of value” does 
not include a meal or other item of nominal value the city official 
or employee receives in return for providing information about 
an item pending on the ballot. 
 (c) Official Vehicles.  A city official or employee shall not dis-
play or fail to remove campaign materials on any city vehicle un-
der his or her control. 
 Rule A-9.  Supervisory Duties270 
 A city official or employee who has direct supervisory authority 
over another person who provides services relating to the business 
of the city shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the con-
duct of the supervised person is reasonably compatible with the 
obligations imposed on city officials and employees by this code 
of ethics. 
 Rule A-10.  Actions of Others271 
 (a) Violations by Other Persons.  A city official or employee 
shall not knowingly assist or induce, or attempt to assist or induce, 
any person to violate any provision in this code of ethics. 
 (b) Using Others to Engage in Forbidden Conduct.  A city offi-
cial or employee shall not violate the provisions of this code of 
ethics through the acts of another. 
Part B.  Former City Officials and Employees 
 Rule B-1.  Subsequent Representation of Private Interests272 
 (a) Representation by a Former Board Member.  A person who 
was a member of a city board or other city body shall not repre-
sent any person, group, or entity for a period of two (2) years af-
ter the termination of his or her official duties: (1) before that 
board or body; (2) before city staff having responsibility for mak-
ing recommendations to, or taking any action on behalf of, that 
board or body; or (3) if any issue relates to his or her former du-
ties, before a board or other city body which has appellate juris-
 
 270 This provision is a very substantial variation and expansion of a provision in 
the San Antonio Ethics Code dealing with city council contract personnel.  See SAN 
ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-53. 
 271 This provision is based on § 2-51 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-11 (similar provision). 
 272 This provision is based on § 2-56 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-14 (similar, but imposing only 
a one-year, rather than a two-year, limitation on representation before the city). 
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diction over the board or body of which the city official or em-
ployee was a member. 
 (b) Representation Before the City.  A former city official or 
employee shall not represent any person, group, or entity, other 
than himself or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, 
before the city for a period of two (2) years after termination of 
his or her official duties.  This subsection does not apply to a per-
son who was classified as a city official only because he or she was 
an appointed member of a board or other city body.  In connec-
tion with the representation of private interests before the city, a 
former city official or employee shall not state or imply that he or 
she is able to influence city action on any basis other than the 
merits. 
 (c) Representation in Litigation Adverse to the City.  A former 
city official or employee shall not, absent consent from the city, 
represent any person, group, or entity, other than himself or her-
self, or his or her spouse or minor children, in any litigation to 
which the city is a party, if the interests of that person, group, or 
entity are adverse to the interests of the city and the matter is one 
in which the former city official or employee personally and sub-
stantially participated273 prior to termination of his or her official 
duties. 
 Rule B-2.  Employment Relating to a City Contract274 
 A former city official or employee shall not, within two (2) years 
of the termination of official duties, perform work on a compen-
sated basis relating to a contract with the city, if he or she person-
ally and substantially participated275 in the negotiation or award-
ing of the contract. 
 Rule B-3.  Continuing Confidentiality276 
 A former city official or employee shall not use or disclose con-
fidential government information acquired during service as a city 
 
 273 According to the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 16, § 2-42(z), “person-
ally and substantially participated” means: “to have taken action as an official or em-
ployee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, giving advice, in-
vestigation or similar action.  The fact that the person had responsibility for a matter 
does not by itself establish that the person ‘personally and substantially participated’ 
in the matter.” 
 274 This provision is loosely based on § 2-57 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, su-
pra note 16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-15(c) (similar provi-
sion, but imposing only a one-year, rather than a two-year, limitation). 
 275 See supra note 273 (defining “personally and substantially participated”). 
 276 This provision is based on § 2-55 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 
16.  See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 246, § 12A-13 (similar provision). 
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official or employee.  This rule does not prohibit: (a) any disclo-
sure or use that is authorized by law; or (b) the confidential re-
porting of illegal or unethical conduct to authorities designated 
by law. 
 
